Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics by Cabrales, Antonio & Ponti, Giovanni
Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated 
Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics1 
Antonio Cabrales 
Departament d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 
25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; and 
ELSE, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London, 
Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom 
and 
Giovanni Ponti 2 
Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, 03071 
Alicante, Spain; and 
ELSE, Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London, 
Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom 
Received August 11, 1997 
This paper studies convergence and stability properties of T. Sjéistréim's (1994, 
Games Econom. Behav. 6,502-511) mechanism, under the assumption that bound-
edly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary 
dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice 
functions in economic environments using as a solution concept one round of 
deletion of weakly dominated strategies and one round of deletion of strictly 
dominated strategies. However, there are other sets of Nash equilibria, whose 
payoffs may be very different from those desired by the social choice function. 
With monotonic dynamics, all these sets of equilibria contain limit points of the 
evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, even if the dynamics converge to the "right" 
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set of equilibria (i.e., the one which contains the solution of the mechanism), it may 
converge to an equilibrium which is worse in welfare terms. In contrast with this 
result, any interior solution of the best-reply dynamics converges to the equilibrium 
whose outcome the planner desires. Journal of Economic Literature Classification 
Numbers: cn, D70, D78. © 2000 Academic Press 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of implementation studies the problem of designing decen-
tralized institutions ("mechanisms") through which certain socially desir-
able objectives can be achieved. More precisely, a social choice rule is 
implemented by a (game-form) mechanism if, for every possible environ-
ment (preference profile), the solution (set of equilibrium outcomes) of the 
mechanism coincides with the set of outcomes of the social choice rule. 
This definition implicitly as sumes that agents are always able to play 
equilibrium strategies. However, there is substantial empirical and experi-
mental evidence against this theoretical presumption.3 In spite of this 
evidence, research in implementation theory has paid little attention to the 
problem of how equilibrium is achieved.4 Since the planner should be 
concerned with the performance of the mechanism when sorne (if not aH 
of the) agents are not as "rational" as expected, it is useful to test the 
mechanism's performance in the presence of sorne form of bounded 
rationality. 
A more fundamental approach to these issues would require the planner 
to take bounded rationality into account, when designing the game agents 
play. This necessarily leads to an alternative definition of implementation 
which includes, among the variables which specify the "environment," the 
learning protocols agents use, as weH as initial conditions of the dynamic 
process. In this respect, we propose the following definition. For a given 
set of environments <t> and a given set of dynamics D, a social choice rule 
is dynamically implemented by a mechanism if, for aH cp E <t> and d E D, 
the limiting set of outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes of the 
social choice rule. 
There is a caveat here. Why should we focus only on limiting outcomes? 
The planner may al so care about what happens on the way to equilibrium, 
as the dynamic path may include outcomes significantly different than 
3 Sec Cooper et al. (1991) far the prisoner's dilcmma, a strictly dominancc solvable game, 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1991) for the centipcde game, a game with a unique Nash cquilibrium, 
and Güth et al. (1982) far the ultimatum game, which has a uniquc subgame pcrfcct 
equilibrium. 
4 Noticeable exccptions are thc papers of Muench and Walker (1984), Walker (1984), 
lardan (1986), Vega-Redondo (1989), De Trenqualye (1988, 1989), and Cabrales (1999). 
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what the choice rule prescribes. This, in turn, would require one to fully 
characterize the planner's preferences, rather than specify the most pre-
ferred outcome, for any given state of the environment. This is something 
the implementation literature traditionally leaves unspecified. Moreover, if 
the planner do es not discount the future and the game is played infinitely 
often, then it is legitimate to look at limiting outcomes. 
In this paper we study the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's (1994) 
mechanism.5 We concentrate on Sjostrom's mechanism for several rea-
sonso First, the conditions for implementation are quite weak. Although 
the environments that are permitted are not universal, they are rich 
enough for most economic purposes. Furthermore, this reduction in the 
domain allows the author to implement the social choice rule with a 
"bounded" game, that is, a game which does not exploit equilibrium 
nonexistence to rule out undesirable outcomes.6 FinallY' the game can be 
solved by one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then 
another round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This feature of 
the mechanism makes it particularly attractive since, under some assump-
tions of imperfect knowledge of agents,7 the appropriate solution concept 
implies one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then the 
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 
In Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism agents are arranged to simultaneously 
announce their own preferences, together with the preferences of their 
two closest neighbors. The mechanism is designed in such a way that the 
truthful report of one's own preferences is weakly dominant, as it does not 
affect one's payoff, except for a set of (so-called) totally inconsistent states, 
where it is (strictly) preferable to report preferences truthfully. Since, for 
this mechanism, it is always advantageous to report the same preferences 
about your neighbors as what they are reporting about themselves, it is 
clear that the only equilibrium that survives the first round of deletion of 
weakly dominated strategies is the truth-telling one. 
However, there are many other Nash equilibria. In particular, for every 
preference profile R, there is a component G.e., a closed and connected 
set) of equilibria in which all agents report the preferences for their 
neighbors indicated in R, and report the preferences about themselves 
indicated in R with high enough (this need not be very high) probability. 
5 Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism and the one proposed by Jackson et al. (1994) for separable 
environments are very similar. Most of our results would generalize easily for that mechanism 
as well. 
6 For example, in the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation (Repullo, 1987), if 
agents disagree widely on the announced preferences, they have to playa game in which the 
agent announcing the highest integer wins a prize. 
7 Either because of payoff uncertainty, as in Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), or through lack 
of common knowledge of rationality, as in B6rgers (1994). 
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This is because it is important for the mechanism that all agents match 
their neighbors' announcements about themselves, but the report about 
oneself is only important in sorne unlikely (totally inconsistent) state. 
First, we study the performance of the mechanism under monotonic 
dynamics (Nachbar, 1990), which essentially imply higher growth rates for 
those strategies which perform better.8 For these dynamics, we show 
(Proposition 4) that many equilibria in all equilibrium components are 
limit points of trajectories of the evolutionary dynamics that have com-
pletely mixed initial conditions (that is, initial conditions that give strictly 
positive weights to all possible messages). Even when the dynamics con-
verge to the "right" component of equilibria (i.e., the one which contains 
the solution of the mechanism), they need not go to the "right" equilib-
rium. We al so show by example (Proposition 2) that the initial conditions 
that lead to these equilibria need not be close to the limiting point. We 
also study how the dynamic structure reacts to the introduction of (arbi-
trarily small) perturbations in the vectorfield. In the example we show 
(Proposition 6) that, a1though there is a unique structurally stable compo-
nent (namely, the component which contains the undominated equilibrium 
of the game), the untruthful component is stable for a non-negligible set of 
admissible perturbations. 
In other words, the less responsive the dynamics are to payoffs (the 
further the initial conditions from the "right" equilibrium), the more 
difficult it is to converge to the desired solution. Only in the extreme case 
of best-reply dynamics (in which the response to arbitrarily small payoff 
differences is infinite), we show (Proposition 7) that any interior trajectory 
converges to the pure strategy equilibrium in which players reveal their 
true preferences and the outcome desired by the planner is achieved. 
The fact that evolution need not eliminate weakly dominated strategies 
has been known since, at least, Nachbar (1990). However, we are far from 
possessing a sound theory on the evolutionary properties of weakly domi-
nance solvable games, as we have examples in which a single round of 
deletion is not allowed if we want to characterize the limiting set of the 
evolutionary dynamics (see, for example, Samuelson, 1993 and Cressman 
and Schlag, 1998), as well as games in which only strategies which survive 
an (arbitrarily large) number of rounds of deletion can be in the support of 
the limiting play (see, for the finitely repeated prisoners' dile mm a, Cress-
man, 1996; or for the centipede game, Ponti, 2000). Since the theory has 
not proposed, so far, a suitable framework to explain these differences, it is 
8 One particularly well known member of the family of monotonic dynamics is the so-called 
replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). These dynamics 
have been given a learning theoretic foundation by B6rgers and Sarin (1997), and they can 
also be interpreted as a model of imitation (Schlag, 1994). 
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important to test the evolutionary properties of (game-form) mechanisms 
in which the iterated deletion of dominated strategies plays such a crucial 
role. In this respect, our findings are very similar to those of Gale et al. 
(1995). They analyze the classic chain store game, another game which has 
a Nash equilibrium component in which a player selects a weakly domi-
nated strategy with positive probability. In both cases, these components 
are reachable by the evolutionary dynamics, and therefore should not be 
discarded as a reasonable predictor of the asymptotic play. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we 
introduce sorne notation, we describe the mechanism, and we make the 
assumptions about the dynamics. In Section 3 we fully characterize (for all 
interior initial conditions) the set of limit points of any monotonic dynamic 
for the game in Fig. 1 (Sjostrom, 1994) to be considered as a simplified 
version of the mechanism. In Section 4 we give local results on the 
convergence and stability properties of the Nash equilibrium components 
of the general game. In Section 5 we describe the structural stability 
properties of the equilibria of the simplified mechanism. Section 6 explores 
the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism under best-
reply dynamics. Finally, Section 7 concludes, together with an appendix 
containing the proofs of the relevant propositions. 
2. THE MODEL AND THE DYNAMICS 
We introduce a few changes to Sjostrom's (1994) model for analytical 
convenience. First, we employ a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion instead of a preference relation. This is because we need to specify 
the payoff functions for mixed strategies, as the dynamics are defined on 
the mixed strategy space. We also as sume that the set of possible prefer-
ence parameters is finite. This is because the dimension of the pure 
strategy space is related with the set of preferences. If we had an infinite 
dimensional pure strategy space, the dynamics, which account for the 
relative frequency with which each pure strategy is being used, would have 
to describe the evolution of a measure over an infinite space. This seems 
an unnecessary complication for our purposes. 
There is a set 1 == {l, ... , n}, n ~ 3, of agents and a set A ~ ffi';' of 
feasible consumption plans. The preferences of agent i E 1 are repre-
sented with a (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function Vi: A X <Pi ~ 
ffi, where <Pi specifies a finite set of possible preference parameters. An 
element Ri of <Pi represents the preferences of agent i over A. A 
preference pro file is a vector R = (R 1, • •• , R n ), which is assumed to be 
common knowledge among the agents. The following assumptions refine 
the sets of feasible consumption plans and preference profiles. 
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Assumption p.1 (free disposal). If a E A and O ::s;; a' ::s;; a, then a' EA. 
Assumption p.2. The set of feasible consurnption plans A is convexo 
For aH a, a' E A and for all A E [0,1] then Aa + (1 - A)a' EA. 
Assumption p.3. The preferences represented by R¡ E <p¡ are strictly 
convexo For any a, a' E R": and for aH A E (0,1), if a =1= a' and v¡(a, R) z 
v¡(a' , R), then v¡(Aa + (1 - A)a', R) > v¡(a', R). 
Assumption p.4. For any R¡ E <p¡ if a z O and a =1= O then V¡(a, R) > 
V¡(O, R)' 
Assumption p.S (preference reversa!). For any R¡, R~ E <p¡ if R¡ =1= R~ 
then there are a, a E A such that v¡(a, R) > v/a, R) and V¡(a, R~) > 
v¡(a, R~). 
For any set B ~ ffi": and any R¡ E <p¡ a choice representation is defined 
as foHows: c(B, R) == {a E B I for aH b E B, v/a, R) z v/b, R)}. 
For any i E l, a social choice function for player i is a rnapping f¡: 
<P ~ A, where f(R) == (j¡(R), . .. , fn(R)). 
Assumption p.6 (individual rationality). For aH i and R, j¡(R) =1= (O, 
O, ... ,0). 
A mechanism is a pair r == (M, 0'), where M == X¡ El M¡ and 0': M ~ A. 
M¡ is the message space of agent i (with generic elernent mi' and 
m = (mI' m 2 , ••• , m n)) and O' is the outcome function. A pair (f, R) (a 
mechanism and a preference profile) defines a garne. 
Let M_¡ == MI X ... X M¡_I X M¡+I X ... X Mn (with generic elernent 
m_J Given a mechanism f and a preference pro file R, we say that m¡ is 
weakly dominated for sorne set of rnessages F == X¡ E 1 F¡ ~ M if there 
exists a rnessage m'¡ E F¡ such that v¡(O'¡(m'¡, m_), R) z v¡(O'¡(m¡, m_), 
R) for aH m_¡ E F _¡ and there is sorne m*-¡ E F _¡ such that v¡(O'¡(m'¡, 
m*-), R) > v¡(O'¡(m¡, m*-), R). Define the set U¡(F: (f, R)) == {mi E F¡ I 
m¡ is not weakly dorninated in F for the garne (f, R)}. 
The rnessage m ¡ is a best response for player i to m _ ¡ E M _ ¡ in the 
garne (f, R), if v¡(O'¡(m¡, m_), R) z v¡(O'¡, m'¡, m_), R) for aH m'¡ E M¡. 
A rnessage profile m is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the garne (f, R), if m¡ 
is a best response to m_¡ in the garne (f, R) for aH i E l. A rnessage 
profile m E M is an undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) for the garne 
(f, R) if it is a Nash equilibriurn and m¡ E U¡(M: (f, R)). Let UNE(f, R) 
== {O'(m) E A 1m is an UNE for the garne (f, R)}. 
We say that a rnechanisrn f implements a social choice function f in 
undominated Nash equilibrium if for all R E <P, f(R) = UNE(f, R). 
For the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies let u¡1(f, R) = 
U¡(M: (f, R)), and if U¡k(f, R) has been defined for k z 1, let u¡k+ I(f, R) 
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== U¡(XjE1U/(f, R): (f, R)). Let U¡"'(f, R) == n~=1u¡k(f, R). Let 
IWD(f, R) == {a(m) E A I mi E W(f, R) for all i}. 
We say that a mechanism f implements a social choice function f with 
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if for all R E <P, f(R) = 
IWD(f, R). 
We now construct a mechanism. 
Let Mi = <Pi - l X <Pi X <Pi + l' so that each individual announces the 
preferences of her two neighbors, and let members of Mi and M be 
denoted mi and m, respectively. A generic strategy is therefore mi = 
(R;_l' R:' R:+ 1)' A K-tuple of messages {mit , . .. , m j) is totally consistent 
if, whenever agents i, k E {jI" .. , h} both announce the preference of 
player j El, then RJ = RJ. Gn the other hand, a K-tuple of messages 
{m it , ... , m j) is totally inconsistent if, whenever agents i, k E {jI"'" h} 
both announce the preference of player j E l, then RJ *" RJ. 
Consider R i, R~ E <Pi' where Ri *" R'i. By Assumption p.S there are 
a, a E A such that ui(a, R) > u¡{a, R) and ui(ii, R~) > ui(a, R '). We can 
choose a and a so that u/a, R) > u/a', R) for all a' in the Hne segment 
between a and a. Given this pair (a, a) let f3¡{R i, R~) == {b E ~';' lb = Aa 
+ (1 - A)a, for A E [0,1]). By construction, for all R i, R 'i E <Pi' c( f3¡{R i, 
R~),R) *" c(f3i(Ri,R~),R~). Let 1>(i,m) == (R?,RL ... ,R;-\R;+1,R;!L 
... ,R~-l) and, for every i and m_ i , define 
IM1>(i,m)) i-l i+ 1 Bi(m- i ) = ~i( Ri , Ri ) -M 1>(i, m)) n 
Now we can define a: 
if m _ i is totally consistent 
if m _ i is totally inconsistent 
otherwise. 
if R;-l = R;=i and R;+l = R;!} 
otherwise. 
Let R be the true preference profile and let R* be an arbitrary preference 
profile. To understand how the mechanism works, notice that the only 
time when the choice of an announcement R; has any effect on i's payoffs 
is when m_i is totally inconsistent. In this case, the outcome is the optimal 
choice within the set f3i(R: - \ R: + 1) according to the announced Ri; This 
is the reason why, for player i, announcing her true preference Ri can 
never hurt. Furthermore, for every alternative announcement R; = Ri, 
there is sorne totally inconsistent m_i with R;-1 = Ri and R;+l = Ri and 
the set f3/.,.) is constructed in such a way that c( f3/Ri' Rj), R) is strictly 
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preferred to c( f3/R¡, Rj), Rj). Therefore, a message m¡ = (R:- 1, R;, 
R:+ 1) is weakly dominated by a message m¡ = (R:_1,R¡,R:+ 1); i.e., un-
truthful announcements about oneself are weakly dominated. 
Once these weakly dominated strategies are eliminated and all agents 
announce the true preferences about themselves, R: = R¡, it is strictly 
dominated to announce untruthful preferences about your neighbors, 
R:+ 1 =l=R¡+l =R:!i or R:- 1 =l=R¡_l =R:=i, since disagreeing with your 
neighbors is punished with the zero consumption bundle. 
These two facts establish the main theorem in Sjostrom (1994). 
PROPOSITION O. Let f be an arbitrary social choice junction. The mecha-
nism described aboue implements f in UNE and in IWD. 
It is important to notice, for the discussion we undertake below, that the 
set of states in which not announcing the true preferences about oneself is 
weakly dominated are themselves states that typically produce very bad 
outcomes for other opponents (at least one of them will have zero 
consumption and probably many). If agents learn fast to avoid these 
(totally inconsistent) states, there is no incentive to tell the truth about 
oneself. The mechanism we have just described focuses on consensus 
announcements, since disagreement is punished with zero consumption; 
truth-telling is only rewarded in a set of states which need not be very 
prominent in the minds of the players. This is precisely the reason why, if 
agents are boundedly rational in the way we describe, convergence to the 
social choice outcome function may fail to occur. 
We now move on to the characterization of the evolutionary dynamics 
we analyze. 
Fix a given mechanism r and a given preference profile R E <1>. Let x['" 
be the probability assigned by agent i to message mi' and let x¡ E d¡ be a 
mixed strategy for agent i (where d¡ denotes the IM¡I - 1-dimensional 
simplex which describes player i's mixed strategy space). Let also x_¡ E 
d_¡ == Xj*¡d j be a mixed strategy profile for agents other than i, with 
x == (x¡,x_) E d == X¡E¡d¡. Finally, let u¡(x¡,x_) = LmEMu/a/m¡, 
m_¡), R)TI jE ¡xTI. 
We formalize player i's behavior in terms of the mixed strategy x/O he 
or she adopts at each point in time. The vector x(t) will then describe the 
sta te of the system at time t, defined over the state space d, with dO 
denoting its relative interior, i.e., the set of completely mixed strategy 
profiles. 
Assumption d.l. The evolution of x(t) is given by a system of continu-
ous-time differential equations: 
(1) 
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We require that the autonomous system (1) satisfies the standard 
regularity condition; i.e., D must be (i) Lipschitz continuous with (in 
LmiE M,D¡m'(X(t)) = O. Furthermore, D must al so satisfy the following 
requirements: 
Assumption d.2. D is a regular (payofO monotonic selection dynamic. 
More explicitly, let g¡(m¡, x_JO) == x;ni(t)/x;ni(t) denote the growth rate 
of strategy mi. Then for all mi' m'¡ E M¡ and all x_¡ E ¡l_¡ it must be that 
sign[g¡( mi' x_¡( t)) - g¡( m'¡, x_¡{ t))] 
= sign [ u ¡ ( m ¡, x _ ¡ ( t )) - U ¡ ( m'¡ , x _ ¡ ( t ) )] . 
Assumption d.2 is commonly used in the literature to capture the essence 
of a selective evolutionary process.9 Given the mixed strategy profile 
played at each point in time, strategies with higher expected payoff grow 
faster than poorly performing ones. 
Assumption d.3. x(O) E ¡lO. 
Assumption d.3 is also standard in the evolutionary literature. It ex-
eludes the possibility that the selection dynamic acts only on a subset of 
the strategy space. This possibility arises because any solution of a mono-
tonic selection dynamics leaves (any face 00 ¡l, as well as ¡lo, invariant 
(and, a fortiori, forward invariant). In other words, a strategy that has zero 
weight at time zero would al so have zero weight at all subsequent times. If 
Assumption d.3 did not hold, the selection dynamics would then operate 
on a different game. 
3. AN EXAMPLE 
We prefix the dynamic analysis of the mechanism with the following 
example, taken from Sjostrom (1994, p. 504), which is intended to convey 
the essence of our results. There is one unit of a single divisible private 
good, which has to be divided among three players: 1, 2, and 3. Preferences 
of players 1 and 2 are increasing in the amount of the good they consume, 
and are common knowledge for all players and the planner. There are two 
possible types for player 3's preferences, which are indexed by O and l. 
Preferences of type O peak at consumption 1/3; preferences of type 1 peak 
at consumption 1/2. Player 3's type is common knowledge among the 
players, but the planner does not know it. 
9 Se e, for example, Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Weibull (1995). 
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1 1 1 
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4'4'2 3' '3 
1 
° .!. ~ 0,0,-2 '3'2 
° .!. .!. 1 
'3'3 0,°'3 .!.O~ 
1 1 1 
3' '2 3'3'3 
FIG. 1. Sjostrom's example: game G. 
For preferences of type o, the social choice function recommends the 
outcome feO) = (1/4,1/4,1/2); for preferences of type 1, f(l) = 
(1/3,1/3,1/3). Notice that the social choice function is such that type 3 
would prefer the outcome f(l) when she is of type O, and the outcome feO) 
when she is of type 1. This provides her with an incentive to conceal her 
type, and therefore the planner needs a nontrivial mechanism to elicit her 
true preferences. 
The mechanism proposed by Sj6str6m requires the three players to 
make a simultaneous statement about the preferences of player 3. Let 
m;(mn, i El represent the message in which preferences of type 1 (type 
O) for player 3 are announced by player i. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome 
function of the mechanism. As for its dynamic analysis, we shall focus on 
the case in which true preferences of player 3 are of type 1, and assume 
that Fig. 1 also represents the game's payoffs when player 3's preferences 
are of type 1. We denote this game by G. 
Player 1 picks a row, player 2 a column, and pI ayer 3 picks a matrix. We 
first note that the mechanism leads to a game which is weakly dominance 
solvable, as it can be reduced to a single outcome (the solution) by the 
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In particular, only one 
round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then an additional 
round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies, is needed. In conse-
quence, unlike other weakly dominance solvable games, the same outcome 
is selected independently on the order by which strategies are deleted.10 
We start by deleting the weakly dominated strategy m~ for player 3 (the 
other agents have no dominated strategies at this stage). The reason is 
that, like in the mechanism described in Section 2, truth-telling about your 
10 Using Marx and Swinkels' (1997) terminology, game G is in faet weakly dominanee 
solvable in a nice sense. So is Sjostrom's (1994) general meehanism presented in the previous 
seetion. 
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own preferences never hurts, and is strictly optimal when the opponents 
disagree on your own type. Once m~ has been removed, strategies m~ and 
mg become strictIy dominated. The reason is that, like in the mechanism 
described in Section 2, if all the players tell the truth about their own 
preference, lying about a neighbor is punished with zero consumption. The 
unique strategy profile selected is then (mL m1, mD, that is, the pure 
strategy profile in which the true preferences are consistentIy revealed. 
Since each player has only two pure strategies in her support, we abuse 
our notation setting Xi == x;"ly In the following proposition we fully 
characterize the set of Nash equilibria of game G. 
PROPOSITION 1. The set NE of Nash equilibria of G is the union of 
precisely two disjoint components NEo and NE 1, where 
NEo == {x E .llx1 =x2 = O,x3 :::;; ~}, 
NE1 == {x E .llx1 = X 2 = 1, x 3 ¿ ~}. 
Proof See Cabrales and Ponti (1998, Proposition 1). I 
We now move on to dynamics. Denote by RE(G) the set of restpoints of 
G under any monotonic dynamic. It is straightforward to show that RE( G) 
contains (together with all the pure strategy profiles) only the components 
and 
Our task is to study the asymptotics of a monotonic selection dynamic 
whose initial state lies in the relative interior of the state space. 
PROPOSITION 2. Any interior solution x(t, x(O)) of a montonic selection 
dynamics i: = D(x) converges to NE. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
If initial conditions are completely mixed, we then know from Proposi-
tion 2 that the evolutionary dynamics will eventually converge to a Nash 
equilibrium of the game. In the next section we show that this result 
generalizes locally also in the case of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, as 
described in Section 2. 
11 The fact that each player has only two available options also allows us to express the 
dynamics in terms of the payoff difference between player ¡'s truthful and untruthful strategy, 
which we call MI,(x_,(t)) (i.e., ~II,(L,(t)) "" u,(m), x_,ct)) - u,(m?, x_,cO)). 
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4. LOCAL RESULTS FOR THE GENERAL GAME 
In Proposition 3 we characterize sorne components of Nash equilibria 
for the game induced by the mechanism. In particular, we show that any 
message profile in which the agents are unanimous in the (arbitrary) 
preference profile they announce, R* (more precisely, the preferences 
they announce about their neighbors and themselves are taken from R*), 
is an equilibrium. Furthermore, any mixed strategy profile in which agents 
mix between messages consistent with R* and other messages that only 
differ in the announcements agents make about their own preferences is 
also an equilibrium, provided that messages in R* are given a high enough 
weight. The equilibria in each of these components are not payoff equiva-
lent, since disagreeing with a neighbor (event with nonzero probability in 
these mixed equilibria) results in a punishment. Nevertheless, Proposition 
4 shows that this punishment is not high enough to prevent these equilib-
ria to be the limit points of sorne interior path of any monotonic selection 
dynamic. 
Befare we proceed, sorne further terminology is needed. Let mi = 
(Ri-1' Ri, Ri+ 1) be a consensus announcement by agent i, let U¡ = 
max R v¡U¡(R), R) be the utility associated to the most preferred outcome 
from the social choice function for agent i with true preferences R¡, and 
let U¡n = max R v¡(Y¡(R), R) be the utility associated to the most pre-
ferred consumption bundle among those that result from dividing the 
bundle s assigned by the social choice function by n. Let also S¡(R*) 
denote the set of aH pure strategies in which announcements about the 
neighbors agree with R*, i.e., 
S¡{R*) = {mi E M¡ IRI-1 = Ri-1' RI+1 = Ri~d, (2) 
with S¡(R*) = {mi E Mi I mi $. Si(R*)} denoting the complement of Si(R*) 
with respect to M¡ and S_i(R*) == Xj*¡Sj(R*) (S_i(R*) == Xj*iS/R*)). 
FinaHy, denote by Sti(R*) the foHowing 
St'{R*) = {Xi Ix;"; = 0, for aH mi $. Si(R*) and x;"f > k¡}, (3) 
where we assume 
for aH i and j =1= i. The set Sti(R*) is the set of aH mixed strategies in 
which i's announcements about her neighbors agrees with R*, and the 
probability of announcing Ri is higher than k¡. 
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PROPOSITION 3. For al! R, R* E ffi and X¡ E Sf'(R*), x is a Nash 
equilibrium oi (f, R). 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
To understand the role of (4) in the proof of Proposition 3, notice that, 
against any X_¡ E Xj",¡S[j(R*), the payoff for agent i using strategy 
mi E SJR*) satisfies the following condition: 
(5) 
This is because, for all j * i, xjj ~ k j , which in turn implies a lower 
bound G.e., (minj"'i kj)n-l) on the probability with which m_¡ is totally 
consistent with m¡ E Si(R*) and, therefore, the payoff uJj¡( cPU, R* )), R) 
is achieved. With the remaining probability 1 - (min j '" i k Y -\ the worse 
that can happen to player i is that her message does not match the 
announcements of his or her neighbors about themselves, in which case 
his or her payoff is u¡(O, RJ By the same token, against any x_¡ E 
xj ", ¡ Sjkj(R*), the payoff for agent i announcing a message m'¡ E Si(R*) is 
at most 
From Eqs. (5) and (6), it follows that 
which implies uJm¡x_) - ui(m'¡, x_) ~ O, provided that (4) is satisfied. 
Also note that, for all x_¡ E » '" ¡ S[j(R*), if mi' m: E SJR*), then 
u¡(m¡, x_) - u¡(m'¡, x_) = O. This is because, in playing any strategy in 
SJR*), agent i rules out the possibility that totally inconsistent states 
occur (at least the announcements about i have to coincide). These are the 
only states in which i's announcement about her own preferences makes a 
difference to her own payoff. 
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We shaH now prove the elements in aH the Nash equilibria components 
characterized by Proposition 3 are reachable, i.e., are limit points for sorne 
interior solution. By Lipschitz continuity, there exists a constant K > ° 
such that for aH mi' X_¡, and x'-¡, we have that 
where the l. I denotes the norm of a vector. This in turn implies that, for aH 
hu > ° with ui(m¡, x_i(t)) - ui(m'¡, x_¡(t)):::; -hv' there exists sorne hg > 
0, such tha! g¡(m¡, X_i(t)) - g/m'¡, x_¡(t)) :::; -hg • By analogy with (7), for 
any mi E S¡(R*), it also must be 
< U¡ - v¡(O, R¡) 
- II j *¡xj7(t)(v¡(/;(cf>(i,R*)),R¡) + U¡ - 2vj (0,R¡)). 
Therefore, if hu is a constant such that O:::; hv < mini,R Vi(fi(cf>(i, 
R* )), R) - ViCO, R), then there exists another constant H E [0,1), with 
U¡ - Vi 0, R¡ + hv i( ( A) jl/(n-o} 
such that, if xj} (t) > H for aH j and t, then strategies not in Si(R*) are 
decreasing at arate not higher than -hg • 
We also need to establish a link between the weight with which mes-
sages m _¡ E S _ /R*) are played and the relative performance of strate-
gies m¡ E Si(R*). This is done by means of the function 
with X(t) = maxJX¡(t)]. The function X/t) accounts for the relative 
weight of messages m_¡ E S_/R*) in x_ i , since only against these mes-
sages do strategies in S/R*) yield different payoffs for player i. Therefore, 
the maximum difference in payoffs between strategies in S/R*), and 
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therefore in growth rates by monotonicity, is eonneeted to xiCt), as shown 
in Lemma 2. 12 Finally, let 
. ( (-KX(O) H
2 
)) L = mm exp 2 • 
i hg (x;nT(O)) 
The eonstant L appears beeause we want to show that x;nT Ct) need not 
go to one in the limit, even if there is eonvergenee to the equilibrium 
eomponent to whieh m* belongs. For any mi E S¡{R*), the ratio 
x;nT(t) xmi(O) 
x;ni(t) x;nT(O) 
is the integral of the differenees in growth rates (thus eonneeted to the 
differenee in payoffs by monotonieity) between mi and mi. This integral 
depends on X(t), as we show in Lemma 2. But X(t) depends on X(O) also, 
as well as on the growth rates of strategies of i's opponents in S _/R*). As 
shown in the following Proposition 4, also the weight of these latter 
strategies has an upper bound whieh depends on hg , K, and H. Thus, the 
eonstant L can be used to set an upper bound for the integral of the 
differenee in growth rates between strategies mi and mi. 
Also notiee that X(O) can be made arbitrarily close to zero (and, 
therefore, L arbitrarily close to 1) by seleeting an initial eondition in whieh 
the aggregate weight of strategies in S _/R*) is arbitrarily small. 
PROPOSITION 4. Assume that, for all i El, x;nT(O)L > H. Then 
(a) for al! mi E Si(R*), x;n{t)/x;ni(O) < exp[ -hgt1H/x;nT(O) for al! 
t and all i; 
(b) x;nf(t) > H for all t; 
(e) x;nf(t)/X;niCt) < (x;nT(O)/x;n{O))(l/L) for all t and mi E S/R*). 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
Proposition 4(b) guarantees that pure strategy equilibria in all equilib-
rium components Gncluding the "wrong" ones) are attraetors of interior 
paths. By Proposition 4(e), the limiting weight of mi is less than 1 
(provided L is suffieiently close to 1), and therefore sorne mixed strategy 
equilibria are attraetors as well, if the initial eonditions give suffieiently 
little weight to strategies in S _/R*). This guarantees that, even if there is 
eonvergenee to the "right" eomponent, it need not be to the pure strategy 
12 In the Appendix. 
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equilibrium (remember that the equilibria are not payoff equivalent, as the 
mixed strategy equilibria have lower expected payoff beca use agents are 
punished for announcing discordant preferences). 
Convergence to mixed equilibria may occur beca use payoffs to all 
strategies in S/R*) are "close," if the weight of strategies in S _ /R*) is 
small. We know, by Proposition 4(a), that the weight of strategies in 
S _JR*) is indeed decreasing. So, even though mi has a payoff advantage, 
this advantage vanishes, and Assumption d.2 (plus Lipschitz continuity) 
guarantees that it does not accumulate fast enough. 
5. MORE ON THE EXAMPLE (STABILITY WITHjOUT DRIFT) 
In the previous section, we extended the convergence result of Proposi-
tion 2 to the general mechanism, showing that the limit points of the 
dynamics for interior initial conditions are generally different from the 
outcomes intended by the planner. We now go back to our example to test 
the stability properties of the various equilibrium components. 
DEFINITION 1. Let x(t, x(O)) be the solution of (1) on state space 11 
given initial conditions x(O). Let also e be a closed set of restpoints in 11 
of the same differential equation. Then: 
(i) e is (interior) stable if, for every neighborhood O of e, there is 
another neighborhood U of e, with U e O, such that for any x(O) E U Íl 
MU Íl 11°) we have x(t, x(O)) E O; 
(iD e is (interior) attracting if it is contained in an open set O such 
that for any x(O) E O Íl MO Íl 11°) we have limt --> 00 x(t, x(O)) E O; 
(¡iD e is globally (interior) attracting if for any x(O) E M.6.°) we 
have limt-->oo x(t,x(O)) E O; 
(iv) e is called (interior) asymptotically stable if it is (interior) attract-
ing and (interior) stable. 
To simplify the analysis, we set additional conditions on the dynamics, 
which is the purpose of the following assumption, (which replaces Assump-
tions d.1-3): 
Assumption dA. The evolution of x(t) is given by the system of contin-
uous-time differential equations 
with A ~ O, /31 = /32 = i, and /33 = /3 E (0,1). 
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In words, the evolutionary dynamic is now composed of two additive 
terms. The first represents the standard replicator dynamic, while the 
second term ensures that, at each point in time, each strategy is played 
with positive probability, no matter how it performs against the current 
opponents' mixed strategy profile (i.e., it points the dynamic toward the 
relative interior of the state space .:l). Following Binmore and Samuelson 
(1999), this latter term is called drift: it opens the model to the possibility 
of a heterogeneity of behaviors. Gale et al. (1995) derive an analogous 
system in the following way. At each point in time, a fixed proportion of 
players (of measure 1 ~ A) is replaced by new individuals whose aggregate 
behavior is represented by a generic, constant, completely mixed strategy 
(i.e., f3), while the rest of the population aggregate behavior follows the 
replicator dynamics. The relative importance of the drift is measured by A, 
which we refer to as the drift leve l. We assume A to be "very small," 
reflecting the fact that all the major forces which govem the dynamics 
should be captured by the evolutionary dynamic defined by D, which here 
takes the form of the replicator dynamics. 
We check how the model reacts to the introduction of such a perturba-
tion. The stability analysis of the replicator dynamics with drift will give us 
information about the effects of small changes in the vector field on the 
equilibria of the system defined by the replicator dynamic (in other words, 
it will test the structural stability of such equilibria). To simply the exposi-
tion, f31 and f32 have been chosen to be 1/2, since only the value of f33 
tums out to be genuinely significant. 
We start by looking at the case of the replicator dynamic without drift 
(i.e., when A = O). We know from Proposition 2 that NE is global1y interior 
attracting, since it attracts every interior path under any monotonic selec-
tion dynamic (of which the replicator dynamic is a special case). We now 
take a closer look at the stability properties of each component of Nash 
equilibria separately (i.e., NEo and NE1). 
Figure 2 shows a phase diagram describing trajectories of the replicator 
dynamic starting from sorne interior initial conditions. The Nash equilib-
rium component NEo (NE1) is represented by a bold segment in the 
bottom-left (top-right) comer of the state space .:l. First notice that, as we 
know from Proposition 2, all trajectories converge to a Nash equilibrium of 
the game. Moreover, the diagram shows (consistently with Proposition 4) 
that there are sorne trajectories of the replicator dynamic which converge 
to NEo, the Nash equilibrium component in which both players 1 and 2 
deliver the false message with probability 1. However, this latter compo-
nent is not asymptotically stable, as can be easily spotted from the 
diagram. Trajectories starting arbitrarily close to NEo, provided x 3 > ~, 
will eventually converge to the truth-telling component. We surnrnarize the 
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FIG.2. The replicator dynamic and game G. 
key properties of these trajectories in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 5. Under the replicator dynamic (i) NE1 is interior asymptot-
ically stable, whereas (ií) NEo is noto 
Proof See Cabrales and Ponti (1998, Proposition 5). I 
We now move to the analysis of the replicator dynamic with drift. 
Let 13 E (0,1) be a generic element of the space of the feasible pertur-
bation. Figure 3 shows trajectories of the replicator dynamic with drift 
under two different specifications of 13. Figure 3(b) represents a situation 
in which, in the proximity of NEo, the drift against m~ is uniform across 
players, where in Fig. 3(a) the drift against m~ is lower. As the diagrams 
show, there is a local attractor close to NE1 in both cases. Moreover, non e 
of the elements of NEo is a restpoint of the dynamic with drift in Fig. 3(b). 
In contrast, in Fig. 3(a) there is an additionallocal attractor which belongs 
to NEo: trajectories starting close to NEo converge to it, as it happens in 
the case of the replicator dynamics without drift. 
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FIG.3. The dynamic with drift and game G. 
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We are interested in the convergence and stability properties of (8) 
when A ~ 0, considering two different configurations of the drift parame-
ter f3: 
CASE A: ( 
23 - 4V30 ) 
f3 E 0, 49 
CASEB: (
23 - 4V30 ) 
f3 E 49 ,1. 
Given 23 -4~J1íf 0.0222673, CASE A depicts a situation in which, for small 
values of Xi' the drift against the untruth-telling strategy is substantially 
lower for player 3 than for her opponents. 
In the following proposition we characterize the set of restpoints of the 
dynamic with drift, together with their stability properties: 
PROPOSITION 6. Let RE( (3) be the set of restpoints of (8) for A suffi-
ciently close to O. The following properties hold: 
(a) Vf3 E (0,1), RE( (3) contains an element of NE\ which is also 
asymptotically stable. 
(b) Under CASE A RE( (3) contains also two additional restpoints, 
both belonging to NEo, one of which is asymptotically stable. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
As we acknowledged in Section 1, there is a striking similarity between 
the content of Proposition 6 and the findings of Gale et al. (1995). They 
also find that, for the entry game, the Nash component in which the 
incumbent carries out her "incredible threat" is reachable under the 
replicator dynamics. Moreover, like our NEo, it fails to be interior asymp-
totically stable, but for certain parameter values it may be asymptotically 
stable when the system is slightly perturbed. Given the failure of asymp-
totic stability without perturbations, one would expect any perturbation to 
move the system away from the unstable component and the weakly 
dominated strategy to become extinct. Proposition 6 tells us that evolution-
ary game theory does not provide a ground for such a claim. Once again, 
the intuition he re is similar to the one in Gale et al. (1995). When there is 
drift, strategies against which the weakly dominated strategy do es poorly 
will have positive weight at all times and, therefore, the part of the 
dynamics that depends on payoffs pushes against the dominated strategy. 
On the other hand, drift may provide a direct push in favor of the 
dominated strategy (and more crucially, in favor of those strategies of the 
other players which do well against the dominated strategy). When the 
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balance between these two forces is right, one gets a stable equilibrium 
with non-negligible weight for the dominated strategy. 
6. BEST-REPLY DYNAMICS AND SJOSTROM'S MECHANISM 
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario. Suppose that x(t) 
evolves according to the dynamics 
i = BR(x) - x, (9) 
with BR(x) denoting the mixed strategy best-reply correspondence BR: 
Ll ~ LlY This alternative dynamic defines a (continuous-time) version of 
the classic best-reply dynamics, often proposed as an alternative to the 
evolutionary dynamics studied hereto. We can give two interpretations to 
(9). Following Matsui (1992), we can use (9) to approximate the evolution 
of an infinite population of players who occasionally update their strategy, 
selecting a best reply to the current population state x(t). Alternatively, (9) 
can be regarded as the continuous-time limit (up to a reparametrization of 
time) of the well known fictitious play dynamic.14 This dynamic accounts 
for the evolution of players' beliefs, when these beliefs follow the empirical 
frequencies with which each pure strategy profile has been played (and 
perfectly observed) in the past, and agents select, at each point in time, a 
pure strategy among those which maximize their expected payoff, given 
their current beliefs. 
Let Si = {mi E Mi IR: = R i}, Si = {mi E Si IRl-l = Ri- 1, R:+l = Ri+1}, 
with S = {s¡}, i El denoting the pure Nash equilibrium in which all agents 
consistently reveal their true preferences (i.e., the "solution" of r given 
the true preference profile R). 
PROPOSITION 7. Any interior solution of (9) converges to s. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
13 Notice that, for sorne x E ~, BR(x) can take infinitely many values. Thus, uniqueness of 
the solution of (9) is not guaranteed. However, since BR(x) is upper-hemicontinuous with 
closed and convex values, it can be shown that the differential inclusion x E BR(x) - x has 
at least one (interior) solution x(l, x(O)), which is Lipschitz continuous and defined, for any 
I 2: O (Aubin and Cellina, 1984, Chapo 2). On the stability properties of (9) see Hofbauer 
(1997). 
14 First introduced by Brown (1951) as an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria, fictitious 
play has been recently re-interpreted as a learning model by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993). We 
prefer here the non-standard version in continuous-time to be consistent with the rest of the 
papeL Nevertheless, in an earlier version of this paper we prove that the same results still 
hold if the dynamics are defined in discrete-time. 
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For best-reply dynamics we have shown that every interior solution 
converges to the unique equilibrium whose outcome is the one the planner 
wants to implement. This is so beca use since initial beliefs are completely 
mixed, they will always be completely mixed, so these weakly dominated 
strategies will always remain suboptimal, will never be played, and their 
weight in beliefs will eventually vanish. This implies that nonequilibrium 
strategies by which agents misrepresent their neighbors' preferences be-
come also suboptimal, and agents will learn not to use them.15 
The results obtained here are so different from those we derived in the 
previous sections essentially because the difference in growth rates be-
tween two pure strategies, in the case of the best-reply dynamics (9), need 
not satisfy Lipschitz continuity. The only strategies with a positive growth 
rate are best responses; this implies that there is an infinite response of 
growth rates to changes in the sign of the differences in payoffs, which is 
precisely what Lipschitz continuity rules out. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that there is room for doubt about the practicability of 
one of the leading examples of implementation with iterated deletion of 
weakly dominated strategies when agents are boundedly rational. As we 
said in Section 1, there are only few papers that study implementation with 
boundedly rational players, so a deeper theoretical study with evolutionary 
tools of other mechanisms studied in the literature would enhance our 
understanding of the performance of these mechanisms with this type of 
agent, a necessary step before mechanisms are used in real life. 
Further empirical study is at least as necessary. It would, for example, 
help to answer the question about which of the dynamics assumptions is 
more appropriate. In this sense, there is already sorne evidence on mecha-
nism design and learning algorithms. Chen and Tang (1998) have done 
experiments with the basic quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard 
(1977) and the paired-difference mechanism by Walker (1981). They esti-
mate different learning models using experimental data, showing that 
variants of stimulus-response learning algorithms (whose expected law of 
motion is the replicator dynamics) outperform the generalized fictitious 
play model. This is also consistent with the good performance that Roth 
and Erev (1995) show for stimulus-response learning algorithms in mim-
15 By analogy, it can be proved that every interior trajectory of (9), for game r, converges to 
(1, 1, 1) (see Cabrales and Pon ti, 1998, Proposition 7). 
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icking the behavior of a range of experimental data, which includes other 
weakly dominance solvable games, like the ultimatum game.16 
But even more importantly, the empirical and experimental work would 
help to design games with good convergence properties to the preferred 
social outcome by revealing how people adjust their play in games like that 
studied in this paper, as well as in other mechanisms proposed by the 
literature. We have already begun to do such experimental studiesY 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show 
that any interior trajectory converges. The reason is that, once conver-
gence has been proved, we can apply the standard result "convergence 
implies Nash under any monotonic selection dynamics" (see, e.g., Weibull, 
1995, Theorem 5.2 Gii)). 
W e start by observing that the dynamic is forward invariant. This implies 
that xJt) is always defined and positive, for any nonnegative t. By 
monotonicity, x 3{t) is also a positive, increasing function of t and bounded 
aboye by 1 (since m1 is a weakly dominant strategy). Therefore, x3{t) must 
converge (this already implies convergence of player 3's mixed strategy). 
Let xi == lim t -> 00 x ¡(t), when such a limit exists. Three alternative cases 
have to be discussed. 
(a) xj = o. If xj = O there must be a time t' such that xit) < ~ for 
t> t'. This implies that there is a k> O such that for all t' > t, dIlJx{t» 
< -k for i = 1,2. This implies, by monotonicity, limt->oo xJt) = O for 
i = 1,2; thus x* = (O, O, O). 
(b) xj = 1. By a similar argument, monotonicity implies x* = (1, 
1,1). 
(c) xj E (0,1). We want to prove that xj cannot converge to a value 
within this range unless the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. To do 
so (given the special features of our example) it is enough to show that, if 
xj E (O, 1), then both players 1 and 2 select, in the limit, the same pure 
strategy. Given that this implies convergence of the full mixed strategy 
16 In their paper, Roth and Erev (1995) show that these dynamics explain the data 
significantly better, according to quadratic deviation measures and others, than a generalized 
fictitious play model which can accommodate behaviors ranging from fictitious play to best 
response dynamics by the estimation of a "forgetfulness parameter" which weights past 
information. For the experimental evidence on learning rules, see also Tang (1996), Chen 
et al. (1997), and Mookherjee and Sopher (1997). 
17 See Cabrales et al. (1998) and Gantner et al. (1998). 
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profile, the result follows. More formally, what we need to prove is 
contained in the following lemma: 
LEMMA 1. Jf xj E (O, 1) then either 
xi = O, i = 1,2 ( CASE O hereafter) 
or 
xi = 1 i = 1,2 (CASE 1). 
Proo! Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that neither of the 
aboye statements is true. In this case, there must exist a sequence {tk}k~ 1 
and a positive constant 8> O such that either X¡(tk) > 8, i = 1,2, or 
X¡(tk) < 1 - 8, i = 1,2 for all k (in other words, as sume that the system 
stays infinitely often an 8 away from the faces of á in which player 1 and 2 
play the same pure strategy). We already noticed that these are the only 
faces of á in which both pure strategies for player 3 yield the same payoff. 
If the system stays away from these faces infinitely often along the solution 
path, then the integral of the payoff difference álI/x(t» goes to infinity 
as t goes to infinity. 
To show this, notice that álI¡(x(t» is a continuous function of x(t) 
defined over a compact set (á). In the case of player 3, such a function 
takes the following form: 
(10) 
Take gM == max¡E 1 x . E ~[Ig¡(m¡, x_¡(t))ll, i.e., the highest possible growth 
,-/ -1 
rate (in absolute value) over all strategies and players (we know a max 
exists, since also g/J is continuous in á). Then define 7 1, 72' 73' and 74 as 
follows: 
8 
(i.e., 7) = l:~]), 7 1 solves 8 exp[ -gM71] = 2" 
8 (i.e., T, ~ ln[ -2 + ~l) 7 2 solves (1 - 8 )exp[ -gM72] = 2" gM 
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S 
'T3 solves s exp[gM'T3 ] = 1 - "2 
6" 
'T4 solves (1 - s )exp[gM'T4] = 1 - "2 
Let a'T == min[ 'T l' 'T 2' 'T 3' 'T4 ] be the lower bound for the time interval in 
which, after each tk , ~ < x¡ < 1 - ~, i = 1,2 and therefore MIix(t)) still 
remains bounded away from O (i.e., MIix(t)) > e(1 -3 e/2) > O, 'r:ft E [tk , tk 
+ a'T D. Denote by G
e 
= {x E LlI MIlx) ¿ e(1-3 e/2)}. Now define 'Y¡(x(t)) 
as the time derivative of the log of the ratio between the probabilities with 
which each of player i's pure strategies are played, which can be expressed 
in terms of the difference in the growth rates: 
a ( x¡{t) ) x¡(t) (l-x¡(t)) 
'Y¡ ( x ( t )) == al In 1 - x ¡ ( t) = X ¡ ( t) - 1 - X ¡ ( t) 
x¡( t) 
Also 'Yix(t)) is a positive number bounded away from zero infinitely 
often since, by Assumption d.1, it is a continuous function of x(t) defined 
on a compact set, which preserves the same sign of Lln 3(x(t)). This implies 
that we can always define a constant ge = minx E G
E 
'Yix(t)), with ge > O 
by Assumption d.2. Also by Assumption d.2, 'Yix(t)) > ge <=> Lln/x(t)) 
> e(1 -3 e/2). If we integrate the value of 'Y/x(t)) over time we then obtain 
which implies that xr = 1, which leads to a contradiction. I 
To summarize, Lemma 1 shows that, if xr E (0,1), x1(t), and xzC!) must 
converge (and therefore x(t) must converge to a Nash equilibrium). Since 
this exhausts aH cases the result foHows. I 
Proof of Proposition 3. We being by noting that, against any m -i E M - i' 
aH strategies mi E S¡(R*) yield the same payoff, as they only differ in i's 
announcement about herself. Since supp[x_¡] ~ S_JR*), totaHy inconsis-
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tent sta tes (the only sta tes where announcements about i's own type 
influence her own payoff) are excludt>d. 
For aH Xi such that xim; > ° only if mi E S¡{R*) we have 
u¡( Xi' x-J ~ L Xr;Ui(Xi' x-J + (1 - L xr;) 
m¡ESi m¡ES¡ 
Then 
;::: (1- L * xr;)[Ilj'¡'ixtl(Vi(f¡(cP(i,R*)),Ri) - vi(O,Ri)) 
m;E S;{R ) 
+(1- Ilj'¡'ixtl)(vi(O,Ri) - [1¡n)] , 
which is great than zero since, by (4), 
I 
The foHowing lemma wiH be useful in the proof of Proposition 4. 
LEMMA 2. Let any mi' m'i E Sj(R*) and Xj. Then 
Proa! Le~Lj such thatxt¡ =xtl for aH mj E Sj(R*)\mj, xt¡ = ° 
for aH mj E S/R*), and xt} = xii + L.m¡ES/R*)Xt¡. 
Since u¡(m¡, x_) = u¡(m'¡, x_) for all x_¡ E S_¡(R*), then g/mi' x_) 
= gJm;, x-J 
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By Lipschitz continuity we have that 
g¡{m¡,x_J -g¡(m¡,L¡) ¿ -Klx_¡ -L¡I (11) 
g¡(m'¡,.L¡) -g¡(m'¡,x_J ¿ -Klx_¡ -LJ (12) 
Since g¡(m¡, L¡) = g¡(m'¡, L) and Ix_¡ - LJ = Xi' the result follows by 
adding up inequalities (11) and (12). I 
Proof of Proposition 4. By contradiction. 
Suppose that (a) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i and strategy m¡ E S¡(R*) and that the boundary time is 
t'. Then it must be 
X;"i(t') H 
x;"'(O) = exp[ -hgt'] x;"i (O) . 
Notice that, for all t, 
u¡(m¡,x_¡{t)) - u¡(mi,x_¡(t)) 
:s; u¡(O,R¡)Ilj*¡xjj(t) + u;(1- Ilj*¡xji(t)) 
-( u¡(f¡( <{l(í, R*)), R¡)Ilj*¡xji(t) 
+u¡(O,R¡)(l - Ilj*¡xji(t))) 
= U; - u¡(O, R¡) 
- Ilj*¡xjJ(t)(u¡(f¡(cP(i,R*)),R¡) + U; - 2u¡(0,R¡)). 
Since (b) is true for t < t', 
u¡(m¡,x_¡(t)) - u¡(mi,x_¡(t)) 
< U; - u¡(O,R¡) -Hn - 1(u¡(fJcP(i,R*)),R¡) + U; - 2u¡(0,R¡)). 
Thus, 
which, by Assumption d.2 and the definition of h{." and hg , implies that 
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Given X;n1(tl) :::; H, if we integrate g/mi' x_Jt)) - g/m;, x_¡(t)) from O 
to ti, we obtain the foHowing: 
This is a eontradietion. 
Suppose that (b) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i, and that the boundary time is ti. Then, it must be true 
that x;n1 (t') = H. 
Notiee that Lemma 2 implies that, for aH m¡ E S/R*)\{mj}, 
Sinee (a) holds for t < ti, (13) implies that 
By integration, 
Adding over aH strategies in S¡(R*), 
This implies X;'1(tl) > H (using the assumption x[nf(O)L > H), whieh is a 
eontradiction. 
Suppose that (e) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i, and that the boundary time is ti. Then it must be 
x;n1 (t') /x;ni(t') = Cx;n1 (O) /x;ni(O»)(l/ L). 
By Lemma 2, for aH m¡ E S¡(R*)\{mj}, 
28
Since (a) holds for t < t', (14) implies that 
By integration, 
which implies that 
which is a contradiction. Since this exhausts all cases the result follows. I 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is constructed as follows. We first 
characterize the limit of the set of restpoints RE( 13), and then analyze the 
stability properties of each of its elements. 
We start by observing that, given 13 E (0,1), any restpoint must be 
completely mixed, and it also must be x 3 > 13, as LlII 3(.) is always positive 
in the interior of the state space Ll (because m~ is a weakly dominated 
strategy). We also know, by continuity of the vectorfield with respect to Á, 
that every limiting restpoint of the dynamic, as Á goes to zero, must lie in 
the set of restpoints of the unperturbed dynamic RE( G). 
First, we analyze the limit set of restpoints under CASE O. In this case, 
both players 1 and 2 play their strategy m~ with probability 1, that is 




and an analogous expression can be obtained for x21 Á. Denote by x~ a 
limiting value in a restpoint, if a limit exists, for x 3• When the limiting 
values for Xl and X 2 are zero we have 
X 6 
lim -=- = ....,--------;:-,-




Notice that, in this case, if a restpoint exists, it must be x~ < ~, since 
x¡/ A > O. We set x3 / A = 0, substitute x¡/ A with the expression in (16), 
solve for x 3' and substitute Xi' i = 1,2 and A by their limiting value of 
zero. The solutions for x~ take the following form: 
XAQ -3 -
1 + 7[3·.j1- [3(46 - 49(3) 
10 
1 + 7[3 - J1- [3(46 - 49(3) 
10 
and 
Remember that x~ must be a real, positive number, with [3 < x~ < ~. For 
the expression under the square root at the numerator to be nonnegative, 
it must be that [3 E [0, 23 ~4~M :::::: 0.0222673], which determines the feasi-
ble range for both roots. Within this interval of values for [3, x~ (XV is a 
strictIy decreasing (increasing) function of [3, which has a minimum and a 
maximum, whose values are 15 ~3;& (O) and -fu (15 ~3;& ), respectively. As 
Q ~ 23 ~ 4& both solutions converge to 15 ~ 2& fJ 49' 35 . 
We now deal with the subset of limiting restpoints under CASE 1, i.e., 
with limiting values for Xi = 1 for i = 1,2. The equations corresponding to 
(15) and (16) are now 
(1 - XI) 12( Xl - ~) 
(17) 
A x l (7x 3 + x 2(1 - x 3 ) - 3) 
(1 - x¡) 3 
lim 2(2x~ - 1) , (18) xi~l A 
A-->O 
where x~ denotes a limiting value for x 3 (if a limit exists). By analogy with 
CASE 0, we know from (18) that, if a restpoint exists, it must be x~ > ~. 
There is a unique feasible solution for xL 't/[3 E (0,1) which has the 
following form: 
A 3+4[3+V9 - 16[3(1-[3) 
Xl = 3 10 . 
Following the same procedure for the remaining restpoints of the unper-
turbed dynamics (i.e., the pure strategy profiles which belong to RE( G) 
and do not satisfy either CASE ° or CASE 1) does not add any element to 
the limiting set of restpoints of the perturbed dynamics. This should not be 
surprising, as any other restpoint of the unperturbed replicator dynamics is 
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unstable with respect to the interior. Since this exhausts all cases, the 
result follows. 
We now move to establish the stability properties of each limiting 
restpoint separately. The Jacobian matrix J(x, A) for the dynamic system is 
as follows: 
(1 - 2xl ) Llll l - A 
-(1-x l )x1(1-x3 ) (1 - x1)x1(7 + x 2 ) 
12 12 
- (1 - X 2 )X2(1 - x 3 ) (1 - 2x2 ) Llll 2 - A 
(1 - X 2 )X2(7 + Xl) 
12 12 
(1 - 2x2 )(1 - X 3 )X3 (1 - 2x l )(1 - X 3 )X3 (1 - 2x3 ) Llll3 - A 6 6 
We analyze CASE ° first. We know that, in this case, we have two 
restpoints, which we call XO == (0,0, xV and XO == (0,0, xV. We evaluate 
the Jacobian when Xl' x 2 ' and A are equal to their limiting value O.e., 
zero). The corresponding eigenvalues are {O, ( - 3 + 7x~) /12, ( - 3 + 
7x~)/12}. There are then two OdenticaI) negative eigenvalues (since any 
limiting x~ < ~ for CASE O), while the third eigenvalue is equal to zero. 
To determine the stability properties of the perturbed system, the sign of 
the eigenvalue whose limit is zero becomes crucial given that continuity of 
JO ensures that the other two will be negative, for any A sufficientIy small. 
We now linearize the restpoints (as a function of A) around NEO. We set 
x( A, 8) == (81 A, 82 A, X ~ + 83 A), where 8 == (81, 82 , 83) denotes the vector 
collecting the coefficients of the linearized system. We then evaluate the 
following expression: 
a det(J(x A) 1- ) 
,J,.O( ° ,,) == l' 'x(A,o) 
'1' x 3 ' u 1m . 
,1.-->0 aA 
We do so because det(J(x, A», which is equal to zero Vx E NEO, will 
preserve the sign of the third eigenvalue, given that the sign of the other 
two will stay constant (and negative) when X is sufficientIy close to NEO 
and A is sufficientIy small. For CASE ° we get the following result: 
-54 + x~(252 + 294xn + (81 + 82 ) 




We first notice that (19) does not depend on 83, To evaluate sign(cf>°(x~, 8)) 
we only need to get estimates of 81 and 82 , the linear coefficients which 
measure the responsiveness of the equilibrium values of Xi' i = 1,2 to 
small changes in A. We do so by setting limA -> ° :AD(X, A)lx(A,IJ) = O and 
solving for {81, 82 , X~}. There are two alternative set of solutions; each of 











23 - 4913 + 7.j1 - 13(46 - 4913) 
81 = 82 = ------8------
We evaluate the numerator of (9) for both sets of solutions, obtaining the 
expressions 
v 3( -7 + 32213 - 34313 2 + (4913 - 23)V1 - 4613 + 49132) 
cf>( 13) = 10 
2863 - 14747613 + 88288213 2 - 154624413 3 
+82354313 4 + kV146f3 + 4913 2 ~(f3)=------10-0-0------
with k = (3887 - 6012313 + 16566913 2 - 11764913 3 ). 
(20) 
(21) 
Both J>0( 13) and ~O( 13) are plotted in Fig. 4. As the diagram shows, 
J>0( 13) is always negative in the domain [O, 23 ~4~#]' whereas ~O( f3) is not. 
In consequence, iO is asymptotically stable whereas XO is noto 
We now move on to CASE 1. Here we have a unique restpoint, which 
we call Xl == (1,1, xD. The eigenvalues of the unperturbed dynamics are as 
follows: {O,O - 2x3 )/3,0 - 2x3 )/3}. As in CASE O, there are two (iden-
tical) negative eigenvalues (given that x 3 > ~), and the remaining eigen-
value is equal to zero. By analogy with CASE O, we define i( A) == O -
81 A, 1 - 82 A, x~ + 83 A) and solve limA -> ° ddAD(x, A)IX(A, IJ) = O to get esti-
mates of 8. The unique feasible solution (corresponding to the unique 










FIG. 4. Asymptotic stability of the dynamic with drift. 
The function corresponding to (20) and (21) now takes the form 
Al _ 24(-a+(2- 413)Va) 
fjJ(13)- 5 ' 
with a = 9 - 1613. The function c$l( ¡3) is also plotted in Fig. 4. As the 
diagram shows, c$l( 13) stays negative 'Vf3 E (0,1). Thus, Xl is asymptoti-
cally stable under any drift configuration. I 
Proaf af Prapasitian 7. For any given arbitrary preference profiles 
R E <1>, with R =1= R, m¡ = {mi $ S¡ I RLl = R¡_l' R:+ 1 = R¡+ l} is weakly 
dominated by m¡ = {mi E S¡ I R:_ l = R¡_l' R:+ l = R¡+l}' which in tum 
implies that, for any interior solution xCt, x(O)) of (9), i;'t(t) = -x;'iCt) 
and, therefore, 
lim X;'i(t) = O (22) 
t --> oc 
for any m¡ $ Si. Let .& denote the face of Ll spanned by the restricted 
game (f, R)lxsi , with 13(.<;) = {x E Ll : Ilx - .&11 :::; e}. An implication of 
(22) is that .& is globally interior attracting for the best-reply dynamics (9), 
as it contains the set of undominated mixed strategies. Furthermore, for all 
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i El, s¡ is a strictly dominant strategy for game (f, R)lxSi • This implies 
that there must exist sorne positive constants s and T(s) such that 
BR(x) = s for any x E B(s) and x(t) E B(s) for any t ~ T(s). We can 
evaluate T(s) explicitly solving (1 - s)exp[ - T(s)] = s: 
(23) 







defines the unique interior solution of (9) for t sufficiently large. This, in 
turn, implies lim t -> oc x(t) = s. I 
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This paper studies convergence and stability properties of T. Sjéistréim's (1994, 
Games Econom. Behav. 6,502-511) mechanism, under the assumption that bound-
edly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary 
dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice 
functions in economic environments using as a solution concept one round of 
deletion of weakly dominated strategies and one round of deletion of strictly 
dominated strategies. However, there are other sets of Nash equilibria, whose 
payoffs may be very different from those desired by the social choice function. 
With monotonic dynamics, all these sets of equilibria contain limit points of the 
evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, even if the dynamics converge to the "right" 
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set of equilibria (i.e., the one which contains the solution of the mechanism), it may 
converge to an equilibrium which is worse in welfare terms. In contrast with this 
result, any interior solution of the best-reply dynamics converges to the equilibrium 
whose outcome the planner desires. Journal of Economic Literature Classification 
Numbers: cn, D70, D78. © 2000 Academic Press 
Key Words: implementation theory, evolutionary dynamics, bounded rationality. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of implementation studies the problem of designing decen-
tralized institutions ("mechanisms") through which certain socially desir-
able objectives can be achieved. More precisely, a social choice rule is 
implemented by a (game-form) mechanism if, for every possible environ-
ment (preference profile), the solution (set of equilibrium outcomes) of the 
mechanism coincides with the set of outcomes of the social choice rule. 
This definition implicitly as sumes that agents are always able to play 
equilibrium strategies. However, there is substantial empirical and experi-
mental evidence against this theoretical presumption.3 In spite of this 
evidence, research in implementation theory has paid little attention to the 
problem of how equilibrium is achieved.4 Since the planner should be 
concerned with the performance of the mechanism when sorne (if not aH 
of the) agents are not as "rational" as expected, it is useful to test the 
mechanism's performance in the presence of sorne form of bounded 
rationality. 
A more fundamental approach to these issues would require the planner 
to take bounded rationality into account, when designing the game agents 
play. This necessarily leads to an alternative definition of implementation 
which includes, among the variables which specify the "environment," the 
learning protocols agents use, as weH as initial conditions of the dynamic 
process. In this respect, we propose the following definition. For a given 
set of environments <t> and a given set of dynamics D, a social choice rule 
is dynamically implemented by a mechanism if, for aH cp E <t> and d E D, 
the limiting set of outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes of the 
social choice rule. 
There is a caveat here. Why should we focus only on limiting outcomes? 
The planner may al so care about what happens on the way to equilibrium, 
as the dynamic path may include outcomes significantly different than 
3 Sec Cooper et al. (1991) far the prisoner's dilcmma, a strictly dominancc solvable game, 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1991) for the centipcde game, a game with a unique Nash cquilibrium, 
and Güth et al. (1982) far the ultimatum game, which has a uniquc subgame pcrfcct 
equilibrium. 
4 Noticeable exccptions are thc papers of Muench and Walker (1984), Walker (1984), 
lardan (1986), Vega-Redondo (1989), De Trenqualye (1988, 1989), and Cabrales (1999). 
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what the choice rule prescribes. This, in turn, would require one to fully 
characterize the planner's preferences, rather than specify the most pre-
ferred outcome, for any given state of the environment. This is something 
the implementation literature traditionally leaves unspecified. Moreover, if 
the planner do es not discount the future and the game is played infinitely 
often, then it is legitimate to look at limiting outcomes. 
In this paper we study the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's (1994) 
mechanism.5 We concentrate on Sjostrom's mechanism for several rea-
sonso First, the conditions for implementation are quite weak. Although 
the environments that are permitted are not universal, they are rich 
enough for most economic purposes. Furthermore, this reduction in the 
domain allows the author to implement the social choice rule with a 
"bounded" game, that is, a game which does not exploit equilibrium 
nonexistence to rule out undesirable outcomes.6 FinallY' the game can be 
solved by one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then 
another round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This feature of 
the mechanism makes it particularly attractive since, under some assump-
tions of imperfect knowledge of agents,7 the appropriate solution concept 
implies one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then the 
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 
In Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism agents are arranged to simultaneously 
announce their own preferences, together with the preferences of their 
two closest neighbors. The mechanism is designed in such a way that the 
truthful report of one's own preferences is weakly dominant, as it does not 
affect one's payoff, except for a set of (so-called) totally inconsistent states, 
where it is (strictly) preferable to report preferences truthfully. Since, for 
this mechanism, it is always advantageous to report the same preferences 
about your neighbors as what they are reporting about themselves, it is 
clear that the only equilibrium that survives the first round of deletion of 
weakly dominated strategies is the truth-telling one. 
However, there are many other Nash equilibria. In particular, for every 
preference profile R, there is a component G.e., a closed and connected 
set) of equilibria in which all agents report the preferences for their 
neighbors indicated in R, and report the preferences about themselves 
indicated in R with high enough (this need not be very high) probability. 
5 Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism and the one proposed by Jackson et al. (1994) for separable 
environments are very similar. Most of our results would generalize easily for that mechanism 
as well. 
6 For example, in the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation (Repullo, 1987), if 
agents disagree widely on the announced preferences, they have to playa game in which the 
agent announcing the highest integer wins a prize. 
7 Either because of payoff uncertainty, as in Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), or through lack 
of common knowledge of rationality, as in B6rgers (1994). 
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This is because it is important for the mechanism that all agents match 
their neighbors' announcements about themselves, but the report about 
oneself is only important in sorne unlikely (totally inconsistent) state. 
First, we study the performance of the mechanism under monotonic 
dynamics (Nachbar, 1990), which essentially imply higher growth rates for 
those strategies which perform better.8 For these dynamics, we show 
(Proposition 4) that many equilibria in all equilibrium components are 
limit points of trajectories of the evolutionary dynamics that have com-
pletely mixed initial conditions (that is, initial conditions that give strictly 
positive weights to all possible messages). Even when the dynamics con-
verge to the "right" component of equilibria (i.e., the one which contains 
the solution of the mechanism), they need not go to the "right" equilib-
rium. We al so show by example (Proposition 2) that the initial conditions 
that lead to these equilibria need not be close to the limiting point. We 
also study how the dynamic structure reacts to the introduction of (arbi-
trarily small) perturbations in the vectorfield. In the example we show 
(Proposition 6) that, a1though there is a unique structurally stable compo-
nent (namely, the component which contains the undominated equilibrium 
of the game), the untruthful component is stable for a non-negligible set of 
admissible perturbations. 
In other words, the less responsive the dynamics are to payoffs (the 
further the initial conditions from the "right" equilibrium), the more 
difficult it is to converge to the desired solution. Only in the extreme case 
of best-reply dynamics (in which the response to arbitrarily small payoff 
differences is infinite), we show (Proposition 7) that any interior trajectory 
converges to the pure strategy equilibrium in which players reveal their 
true preferences and the outcome desired by the planner is achieved. 
The fact that evolution need not eliminate weakly dominated strategies 
has been known since, at least, Nachbar (1990). However, we are far from 
possessing a sound theory on the evolutionary properties of weakly domi-
nance solvable games, as we have examples in which a single round of 
deletion is not allowed if we want to characterize the limiting set of the 
evolutionary dynamics (see, for example, Samuelson, 1993 and Cressman 
and Schlag, 1998), as well as games in which only strategies which survive 
an (arbitrarily large) number of rounds of deletion can be in the support of 
the limiting play (see, for the finitely repeated prisoners' dile mm a, Cress-
man, 1996; or for the centipede game, Ponti, 2000). Since the theory has 
not proposed, so far, a suitable framework to explain these differences, it is 
8 One particularly well known member of the family of monotonic dynamics is the so-called 
replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). These dynamics 
have been given a learning theoretic foundation by B6rgers and Sarin (1997), and they can 
also be interpreted as a model of imitation (Schlag, 1994). 
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important to test the evolutionary properties of (game-form) mechanisms 
in which the iterated deletion of dominated strategies plays such a crucial 
role. In this respect, our findings are very similar to those of Gale et al. 
(1995). They analyze the classic chain store game, another game which has 
a Nash equilibrium component in which a player selects a weakly domi-
nated strategy with positive probability. In both cases, these components 
are reachable by the evolutionary dynamics, and therefore should not be 
discarded as a reasonable predictor of the asymptotic play. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we 
introduce sorne notation, we describe the mechanism, and we make the 
assumptions about the dynamics. In Section 3 we fully characterize (for all 
interior initial conditions) the set of limit points of any monotonic dynamic 
for the game in Fig. 1 (Sjostrom, 1994) to be considered as a simplified 
version of the mechanism. In Section 4 we give local results on the 
convergence and stability properties of the Nash equilibrium components 
of the general game. In Section 5 we describe the structural stability 
properties of the equilibria of the simplified mechanism. Section 6 explores 
the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism under best-
reply dynamics. Finally, Section 7 concludes, together with an appendix 
containing the proofs of the relevant propositions. 
2. THE MODEL AND THE DYNAMICS 
We introduce a few changes to Sjostrom's (1994) model for analytical 
convenience. First, we employ a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion instead of a preference relation. This is because we need to specify 
the payoff functions for mixed strategies, as the dynamics are defined on 
the mixed strategy space. We also as sume that the set of possible prefer-
ence parameters is finite. This is because the dimension of the pure 
strategy space is related with the set of preferences. If we had an infinite 
dimensional pure strategy space, the dynamics, which account for the 
relative frequency with which each pure strategy is being used, would have 
to describe the evolution of a measure over an infinite space. This seems 
an unnecessary complication for our purposes. 
There is a set 1 == {l, ... , n}, n ~ 3, of agents and a set A ~ ffi';' of 
feasible consumption plans. The preferences of agent i E 1 are repre-
sented with a (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function Vi: A X <Pi ~ 
ffi, where <Pi specifies a finite set of possible preference parameters. An 
element Ri of <Pi represents the preferences of agent i over A. A 
preference pro file is a vector R = (R 1, • •• , R n ), which is assumed to be 
common knowledge among the agents. The following assumptions refine 
the sets of feasible consumption plans and preference profiles. 
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Assumption p.1 (free disposal). If a E A and O ::s;; a' ::s;; a, then a' EA. 
Assumption p.2. The set of feasible consurnption plans A is convexo 
For aH a, a' E A and for all A E [0,1] then Aa + (1 - A)a' EA. 
Assumption p.3. The preferences represented by R¡ E <p¡ are strictly 
convexo For any a, a' E R": and for aH A E (0,1), if a =1= a' and v¡(a, R) z 
v¡(a' , R), then v¡(Aa + (1 - A)a', R) > v¡(a', R). 
Assumption p.4. For any R¡ E <p¡ if a z O and a =1= O then V¡(a, R) > 
V¡(O, R)' 
Assumption p.S (preference reversa!). For any R¡, R~ E <p¡ if R¡ =1= R~ 
then there are a, a E A such that v¡(a, R) > v/a, R) and V¡(a, R~) > 
v¡(a, R~). 
For any set B ~ ffi": and any R¡ E <p¡ a choice representation is defined 
as foHows: c(B, R) == {a E B I for aH b E B, v/a, R) z v/b, R)}. 
For any i E l, a social choice function for player i is a rnapping f¡: 
<P ~ A, where f(R) == (j¡(R), . .. , fn(R)). 
Assumption p.6 (individual rationality). For aH i and R, j¡(R) =1= (O, 
O, ... ,0). 
A mechanism is a pair r == (M, 0'), where M == X¡ El M¡ and 0': M ~ A. 
M¡ is the message space of agent i (with generic elernent mi' and 
m = (mI' m 2 , ••• , m n)) and O' is the outcome function. A pair (f, R) (a 
mechanism and a preference profile) defines a garne. 
Let M_¡ == MI X ... X M¡_I X M¡+I X ... X Mn (with generic elernent 
m_J Given a mechanism f and a preference pro file R, we say that m¡ is 
weakly dominated for sorne set of rnessages F == X¡ E 1 F¡ ~ M if there 
exists a rnessage m'¡ E F¡ such that v¡(O'¡(m'¡, m_), R) z v¡(O'¡(m¡, m_), 
R) for aH m_¡ E F _¡ and there is sorne m*-¡ E F _¡ such that v¡(O'¡(m'¡, 
m*-), R) > v¡(O'¡(m¡, m*-), R). Define the set U¡(F: (f, R)) == {mi E F¡ I 
m¡ is not weakly dorninated in F for the garne (f, R)}. 
The rnessage m ¡ is a best response for player i to m _ ¡ E M _ ¡ in the 
garne (f, R), if v¡(O'¡(m¡, m_), R) z v¡(O'¡, m'¡, m_), R) for aH m'¡ E M¡. 
A rnessage profile m is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the garne (f, R), if m¡ 
is a best response to m_¡ in the garne (f, R) for aH i E l. A rnessage 
profile m E M is an undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) for the garne 
(f, R) if it is a Nash equilibriurn and m¡ E U¡(M: (f, R)). Let UNE(f, R) 
== {O'(m) E A 1m is an UNE for the garne (f, R)}. 
We say that a rnechanisrn f implements a social choice function f in 
undominated Nash equilibrium if for all R E <P, f(R) = UNE(f, R). 
For the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies let u¡1(f, R) = 
U¡(M: (f, R)), and if U¡k(f, R) has been defined for k z 1, let u¡k+ I(f, R) 
42
== U¡(XjE1U/(f, R): (f, R)). Let U¡"'(f, R) == n~=1u¡k(f, R). Let 
IWD(f, R) == {a(m) E A I mi E W(f, R) for all i}. 
We say that a mechanism f implements a social choice function f with 
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if for all R E <P, f(R) = 
IWD(f, R). 
We now construct a mechanism. 
Let Mi = <Pi - l X <Pi X <Pi + l' so that each individual announces the 
preferences of her two neighbors, and let members of Mi and M be 
denoted mi and m, respectively. A generic strategy is therefore mi = 
(R;_l' R:' R:+ 1)' A K-tuple of messages {mit , . .. , m j) is totally consistent 
if, whenever agents i, k E {jI" .. , h} both announce the preference of 
player j El, then RJ = RJ. Gn the other hand, a K-tuple of messages 
{m it , ... , m j) is totally inconsistent if, whenever agents i, k E {jI"'" h} 
both announce the preference of player j E l, then RJ *" RJ. 
Consider R i, R~ E <Pi' where Ri *" R'i. By Assumption p.S there are 
a, a E A such that ui(a, R) > u¡{a, R) and ui(ii, R~) > ui(a, R '). We can 
choose a and a so that u/a, R) > u/a', R) for all a' in the Hne segment 
between a and a. Given this pair (a, a) let f3¡{R i, R~) == {b E ~';' lb = Aa 
+ (1 - A)a, for A E [0,1]). By construction, for all R i, R 'i E <Pi' c( f3¡{R i, 
R~),R) *" c(f3i(Ri,R~),R~). Let 1>(i,m) == (R?,RL ... ,R;-\R;+1,R;!L 
... ,R~-l) and, for every i and m_ i , define 
IM1>(i,m)) i-l i+ 1 Bi(m- i ) = ~i( Ri , Ri ) -M 1>(i, m)) n 
Now we can define a: 
if m _ i is totally consistent 
if m _ i is totally inconsistent 
otherwise. 
if R;-l = R;=i and R;+l = R;!} 
otherwise. 
Let R be the true preference profile and let R* be an arbitrary preference 
profile. To understand how the mechanism works, notice that the only 
time when the choice of an announcement R; has any effect on i's payoffs 
is when m_i is totally inconsistent. In this case, the outcome is the optimal 
choice within the set f3i(R: - \ R: + 1) according to the announced Ri; This 
is the reason why, for player i, announcing her true preference Ri can 
never hurt. Furthermore, for every alternative announcement R; = Ri, 
there is sorne totally inconsistent m_i with R;-1 = Ri and R;+l = Ri and 
the set f3/.,.) is constructed in such a way that c( f3/Ri' Rj), R) is strictly 
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preferred to c( f3/R¡, Rj), Rj). Therefore, a message m¡ = (R:- 1, R;, 
R:+ 1) is weakly dominated by a message m¡ = (R:_1,R¡,R:+ 1); i.e., un-
truthful announcements about oneself are weakly dominated. 
Once these weakly dominated strategies are eliminated and all agents 
announce the true preferences about themselves, R: = R¡, it is strictly 
dominated to announce untruthful preferences about your neighbors, 
R:+ 1 =l=R¡+l =R:!i or R:- 1 =l=R¡_l =R:=i, since disagreeing with your 
neighbors is punished with the zero consumption bundle. 
These two facts establish the main theorem in Sjostrom (1994). 
PROPOSITION O. Let f be an arbitrary social choice junction. The mecha-
nism described aboue implements f in UNE and in IWD. 
It is important to notice, for the discussion we undertake below, that the 
set of states in which not announcing the true preferences about oneself is 
weakly dominated are themselves states that typically produce very bad 
outcomes for other opponents (at least one of them will have zero 
consumption and probably many). If agents learn fast to avoid these 
(totally inconsistent) states, there is no incentive to tell the truth about 
oneself. The mechanism we have just described focuses on consensus 
announcements, since disagreement is punished with zero consumption; 
truth-telling is only rewarded in a set of states which need not be very 
prominent in the minds of the players. This is precisely the reason why, if 
agents are boundedly rational in the way we describe, convergence to the 
social choice outcome function may fail to occur. 
We now move on to the characterization of the evolutionary dynamics 
we analyze. 
Fix a given mechanism r and a given preference profile R E <1>. Let x['" 
be the probability assigned by agent i to message mi' and let x¡ E d¡ be a 
mixed strategy for agent i (where d¡ denotes the IM¡I - 1-dimensional 
simplex which describes player i's mixed strategy space). Let also x_¡ E 
d_¡ == Xj*¡d j be a mixed strategy profile for agents other than i, with 
x == (x¡,x_) E d == X¡E¡d¡. Finally, let u¡(x¡,x_) = LmEMu/a/m¡, 
m_¡), R)TI jE ¡xTI. 
We formalize player i's behavior in terms of the mixed strategy x/O he 
or she adopts at each point in time. The vector x(t) will then describe the 
sta te of the system at time t, defined over the state space d, with dO 
denoting its relative interior, i.e., the set of completely mixed strategy 
profiles. 
Assumption d.l. The evolution of x(t) is given by a system of continu-
ous-time differential equations: 
(1) 
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We require that the autonomous system (1) satisfies the standard 
regularity condition; i.e., D must be (i) Lipschitz continuous with (in 
LmiE M,D¡m'(X(t)) = O. Furthermore, D must al so satisfy the following 
requirements: 
Assumption d.2. D is a regular (payofO monotonic selection dynamic. 
More explicitly, let g¡(m¡, x_JO) == x;ni(t)/x;ni(t) denote the growth rate 
of strategy mi. Then for all mi' m'¡ E M¡ and all x_¡ E ¡l_¡ it must be that 
sign[g¡( mi' x_¡( t)) - g¡( m'¡, x_¡{ t))] 
= sign [ u ¡ ( m ¡, x _ ¡ ( t )) - U ¡ ( m'¡ , x _ ¡ ( t ) )] . 
Assumption d.2 is commonly used in the literature to capture the essence 
of a selective evolutionary process.9 Given the mixed strategy profile 
played at each point in time, strategies with higher expected payoff grow 
faster than poorly performing ones. 
Assumption d.3. x(O) E ¡lO. 
Assumption d.3 is also standard in the evolutionary literature. It ex-
eludes the possibility that the selection dynamic acts only on a subset of 
the strategy space. This possibility arises because any solution of a mono-
tonic selection dynamics leaves (any face 00 ¡l, as well as ¡lo, invariant 
(and, a fortiori, forward invariant). In other words, a strategy that has zero 
weight at time zero would al so have zero weight at all subsequent times. If 
Assumption d.3 did not hold, the selection dynamics would then operate 
on a different game. 
3. AN EXAMPLE 
We prefix the dynamic analysis of the mechanism with the following 
example, taken from Sjostrom (1994, p. 504), which is intended to convey 
the essence of our results. There is one unit of a single divisible private 
good, which has to be divided among three players: 1, 2, and 3. Preferences 
of players 1 and 2 are increasing in the amount of the good they consume, 
and are common knowledge for all players and the planner. There are two 
possible types for player 3's preferences, which are indexed by O and l. 
Preferences of type O peak at consumption 1/3; preferences of type 1 peak 
at consumption 1/2. Player 3's type is common knowledge among the 
players, but the planner does not know it. 
9 Se e, for example, Samuelson and Zhang (1992) and Weibull (1995). 
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FIG. 1. Sjostrom's example: game G. 
For preferences of type o, the social choice function recommends the 
outcome feO) = (1/4,1/4,1/2); for preferences of type 1, f(l) = 
(1/3,1/3,1/3). Notice that the social choice function is such that type 3 
would prefer the outcome f(l) when she is of type O, and the outcome feO) 
when she is of type 1. This provides her with an incentive to conceal her 
type, and therefore the planner needs a nontrivial mechanism to elicit her 
true preferences. 
The mechanism proposed by Sj6str6m requires the three players to 
make a simultaneous statement about the preferences of player 3. Let 
m;(mn, i El represent the message in which preferences of type 1 (type 
O) for player 3 are announced by player i. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome 
function of the mechanism. As for its dynamic analysis, we shall focus on 
the case in which true preferences of player 3 are of type 1, and assume 
that Fig. 1 also represents the game's payoffs when player 3's preferences 
are of type 1. We denote this game by G. 
Player 1 picks a row, player 2 a column, and pI ayer 3 picks a matrix. We 
first note that the mechanism leads to a game which is weakly dominance 
solvable, as it can be reduced to a single outcome (the solution) by the 
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In particular, only one 
round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then an additional 
round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies, is needed. In conse-
quence, unlike other weakly dominance solvable games, the same outcome 
is selected independently on the order by which strategies are deleted.10 
We start by deleting the weakly dominated strategy m~ for player 3 (the 
other agents have no dominated strategies at this stage). The reason is 
that, like in the mechanism described in Section 2, truth-telling about your 
10 Using Marx and Swinkels' (1997) terminology, game G is in faet weakly dominanee 
solvable in a nice sense. So is Sjostrom's (1994) general meehanism presented in the previous 
seetion. 
46
own preferences never hurts, and is strictly optimal when the opponents 
disagree on your own type. Once m~ has been removed, strategies m~ and 
mg become strictIy dominated. The reason is that, like in the mechanism 
described in Section 2, if all the players tell the truth about their own 
preference, lying about a neighbor is punished with zero consumption. The 
unique strategy profile selected is then (mL m1, mD, that is, the pure 
strategy profile in which the true preferences are consistentIy revealed. 
Since each player has only two pure strategies in her support, we abuse 
our notation setting Xi == x;"ly In the following proposition we fully 
characterize the set of Nash equilibria of game G. 
PROPOSITION 1. The set NE of Nash equilibria of G is the union of 
precisely two disjoint components NEo and NE 1, where 
NEo == {x E .llx1 =x2 = O,x3 :::;; ~}, 
NE1 == {x E .llx1 = X 2 = 1, x 3 ¿ ~}. 
Proof See Cabrales and Ponti (1998, Proposition 1). I 
We now move on to dynamics. Denote by RE(G) the set of restpoints of 
G under any monotonic dynamic. It is straightforward to show that RE( G) 
contains (together with all the pure strategy profiles) only the components 
and 
Our task is to study the asymptotics of a monotonic selection dynamic 
whose initial state lies in the relative interior of the state space. 
PROPOSITION 2. Any interior solution x(t, x(O)) of a montonic selection 
dynamics i: = D(x) converges to NE. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
If initial conditions are completely mixed, we then know from Proposi-
tion 2 that the evolutionary dynamics will eventually converge to a Nash 
equilibrium of the game. In the next section we show that this result 
generalizes locally also in the case of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, as 
described in Section 2. 
11 The fact that each player has only two available options also allows us to express the 
dynamics in terms of the payoff difference between player ¡'s truthful and untruthful strategy, 
which we call MI,(x_,(t)) (i.e., ~II,(L,(t)) "" u,(m), x_,ct)) - u,(m?, x_,cO)). 
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4. LOCAL RESULTS FOR THE GENERAL GAME 
In Proposition 3 we characterize sorne components of Nash equilibria 
for the game induced by the mechanism. In particular, we show that any 
message profile in which the agents are unanimous in the (arbitrary) 
preference profile they announce, R* (more precisely, the preferences 
they announce about their neighbors and themselves are taken from R*), 
is an equilibrium. Furthermore, any mixed strategy profile in which agents 
mix between messages consistent with R* and other messages that only 
differ in the announcements agents make about their own preferences is 
also an equilibrium, provided that messages in R* are given a high enough 
weight. The equilibria in each of these components are not payoff equiva-
lent, since disagreeing with a neighbor (event with nonzero probability in 
these mixed equilibria) results in a punishment. Nevertheless, Proposition 
4 shows that this punishment is not high enough to prevent these equilib-
ria to be the limit points of sorne interior path of any monotonic selection 
dynamic. 
Befare we proceed, sorne further terminology is needed. Let mi = 
(Ri-1' Ri, Ri+ 1) be a consensus announcement by agent i, let U¡ = 
max R v¡U¡(R), R) be the utility associated to the most preferred outcome 
from the social choice function for agent i with true preferences R¡, and 
let U¡n = max R v¡(Y¡(R), R) be the utility associated to the most pre-
ferred consumption bundle among those that result from dividing the 
bundle s assigned by the social choice function by n. Let also S¡(R*) 
denote the set of aH pure strategies in which announcements about the 
neighbors agree with R*, i.e., 
S¡{R*) = {mi E M¡ IRI-1 = Ri-1' RI+1 = Ri~d, (2) 
with S¡(R*) = {mi E Mi I mi $. Si(R*)} denoting the complement of Si(R*) 
with respect to M¡ and S_i(R*) == Xj*¡Sj(R*) (S_i(R*) == Xj*iS/R*)). 
FinaHy, denote by Sti(R*) the foHowing 
St'{R*) = {Xi Ix;"; = 0, for aH mi $. Si(R*) and x;"f > k¡}, (3) 
where we assume 
for aH i and j =1= i. The set Sti(R*) is the set of aH mixed strategies in 
which i's announcements about her neighbors agrees with R*, and the 
probability of announcing Ri is higher than k¡. 
48
PROPOSITION 3. For al! R, R* E ffi and X¡ E Sf'(R*), x is a Nash 
equilibrium oi (f, R). 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
To understand the role of (4) in the proof of Proposition 3, notice that, 
against any X_¡ E Xj",¡S[j(R*), the payoff for agent i using strategy 
mi E SJR*) satisfies the following condition: 
(5) 
This is because, for all j * i, xjj ~ k j , which in turn implies a lower 
bound G.e., (minj"'i kj)n-l) on the probability with which m_¡ is totally 
consistent with m¡ E Si(R*) and, therefore, the payoff uJj¡( cPU, R* )), R) 
is achieved. With the remaining probability 1 - (min j '" i k Y -\ the worse 
that can happen to player i is that her message does not match the 
announcements of his or her neighbors about themselves, in which case 
his or her payoff is u¡(O, RJ By the same token, against any x_¡ E 
xj ", ¡ Sjkj(R*), the payoff for agent i announcing a message m'¡ E Si(R*) is 
at most 
From Eqs. (5) and (6), it follows that 
which implies uJm¡x_) - ui(m'¡, x_) ~ O, provided that (4) is satisfied. 
Also note that, for all x_¡ E » '" ¡ S[j(R*), if mi' m: E SJR*), then 
u¡(m¡, x_) - u¡(m'¡, x_) = O. This is because, in playing any strategy in 
SJR*), agent i rules out the possibility that totally inconsistent states 
occur (at least the announcements about i have to coincide). These are the 
only states in which i's announcement about her own preferences makes a 
difference to her own payoff. 
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We shaH now prove the elements in aH the Nash equilibria components 
characterized by Proposition 3 are reachable, i.e., are limit points for sorne 
interior solution. By Lipschitz continuity, there exists a constant K > ° 
such that for aH mi' X_¡, and x'-¡, we have that 
where the l. I denotes the norm of a vector. This in turn implies that, for aH 
hu > ° with ui(m¡, x_i(t)) - ui(m'¡, x_¡(t)):::; -hv' there exists sorne hg > 
0, such tha! g¡(m¡, X_i(t)) - g/m'¡, x_¡(t)) :::; -hg • By analogy with (7), for 
any mi E S¡(R*), it also must be 
< U¡ - v¡(O, R¡) 
- II j *¡xj7(t)(v¡(/;(cf>(i,R*)),R¡) + U¡ - 2vj (0,R¡)). 
Therefore, if hu is a constant such that O:::; hv < mini,R Vi(fi(cf>(i, 
R* )), R) - ViCO, R), then there exists another constant H E [0,1), with 
U¡ - Vi 0, R¡ + hv i( ( A) jl/(n-o} 
such that, if xj} (t) > H for aH j and t, then strategies not in Si(R*) are 
decreasing at arate not higher than -hg • 
We also need to establish a link between the weight with which mes-
sages m _¡ E S _ /R*) are played and the relative performance of strate-
gies m¡ E Si(R*). This is done by means of the function 
with X(t) = maxJX¡(t)]. The function X/t) accounts for the relative 
weight of messages m_¡ E S_/R*) in x_ i , since only against these mes-
sages do strategies in S/R*) yield different payoffs for player i. Therefore, 
the maximum difference in payoffs between strategies in S/R*), and 
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therefore in growth rates by monotonicity, is eonneeted to xiCt), as shown 
in Lemma 2. 12 Finally, let 
. ( (-KX(O) H
2 
)) L = mm exp 2 • 
i hg (x;nT(O)) 
The eonstant L appears beeause we want to show that x;nT Ct) need not 
go to one in the limit, even if there is eonvergenee to the equilibrium 
eomponent to whieh m* belongs. For any mi E S¡{R*), the ratio 
x;nT(t) xmi(O) 
x;ni(t) x;nT(O) 
is the integral of the differenees in growth rates (thus eonneeted to the 
differenee in payoffs by monotonieity) between mi and mi. This integral 
depends on X(t), as we show in Lemma 2. But X(t) depends on X(O) also, 
as well as on the growth rates of strategies of i's opponents in S _/R*). As 
shown in the following Proposition 4, also the weight of these latter 
strategies has an upper bound whieh depends on hg , K, and H. Thus, the 
eonstant L can be used to set an upper bound for the integral of the 
differenee in growth rates between strategies mi and mi. 
Also notiee that X(O) can be made arbitrarily close to zero (and, 
therefore, L arbitrarily close to 1) by seleeting an initial eondition in whieh 
the aggregate weight of strategies in S _/R*) is arbitrarily small. 
PROPOSITION 4. Assume that, for all i El, x;nT(O)L > H. Then 
(a) for al! mi E Si(R*), x;n{t)/x;ni(O) < exp[ -hgt1H/x;nT(O) for al! 
t and all i; 
(b) x;nf(t) > H for all t; 
(e) x;nf(t)/X;niCt) < (x;nT(O)/x;n{O))(l/L) for all t and mi E S/R*). 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
Proposition 4(b) guarantees that pure strategy equilibria in all equilib-
rium components Gncluding the "wrong" ones) are attraetors of interior 
paths. By Proposition 4(e), the limiting weight of mi is less than 1 
(provided L is suffieiently close to 1), and therefore sorne mixed strategy 
equilibria are attraetors as well, if the initial eonditions give suffieiently 
little weight to strategies in S _/R*). This guarantees that, even if there is 
eonvergenee to the "right" eomponent, it need not be to the pure strategy 
12 In the Appendix. 
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equilibrium (remember that the equilibria are not payoff equivalent, as the 
mixed strategy equilibria have lower expected payoff beca use agents are 
punished for announcing discordant preferences). 
Convergence to mixed equilibria may occur beca use payoffs to all 
strategies in S/R*) are "close," if the weight of strategies in S _ /R*) is 
small. We know, by Proposition 4(a), that the weight of strategies in 
S _JR*) is indeed decreasing. So, even though mi has a payoff advantage, 
this advantage vanishes, and Assumption d.2 (plus Lipschitz continuity) 
guarantees that it does not accumulate fast enough. 
5. MORE ON THE EXAMPLE (STABILITY WITHjOUT DRIFT) 
In the previous section, we extended the convergence result of Proposi-
tion 2 to the general mechanism, showing that the limit points of the 
dynamics for interior initial conditions are generally different from the 
outcomes intended by the planner. We now go back to our example to test 
the stability properties of the various equilibrium components. 
DEFINITION 1. Let x(t, x(O)) be the solution of (1) on state space 11 
given initial conditions x(O). Let also e be a closed set of restpoints in 11 
of the same differential equation. Then: 
(i) e is (interior) stable if, for every neighborhood O of e, there is 
another neighborhood U of e, with U e O, such that for any x(O) E U Íl 
MU Íl 11°) we have x(t, x(O)) E O; 
(iD e is (interior) attracting if it is contained in an open set O such 
that for any x(O) E O Íl MO Íl 11°) we have limt --> 00 x(t, x(O)) E O; 
(¡iD e is globally (interior) attracting if for any x(O) E M.6.°) we 
have limt-->oo x(t,x(O)) E O; 
(iv) e is called (interior) asymptotically stable if it is (interior) attract-
ing and (interior) stable. 
To simplify the analysis, we set additional conditions on the dynamics, 
which is the purpose of the following assumption, (which replaces Assump-
tions d.1-3): 
Assumption dA. The evolution of x(t) is given by the system of contin-
uous-time differential equations 
with A ~ O, /31 = /32 = i, and /33 = /3 E (0,1). 
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In words, the evolutionary dynamic is now composed of two additive 
terms. The first represents the standard replicator dynamic, while the 
second term ensures that, at each point in time, each strategy is played 
with positive probability, no matter how it performs against the current 
opponents' mixed strategy profile (i.e., it points the dynamic toward the 
relative interior of the state space .:l). Following Binmore and Samuelson 
(1999), this latter term is called drift: it opens the model to the possibility 
of a heterogeneity of behaviors. Gale et al. (1995) derive an analogous 
system in the following way. At each point in time, a fixed proportion of 
players (of measure 1 ~ A) is replaced by new individuals whose aggregate 
behavior is represented by a generic, constant, completely mixed strategy 
(i.e., f3), while the rest of the population aggregate behavior follows the 
replicator dynamics. The relative importance of the drift is measured by A, 
which we refer to as the drift leve l. We assume A to be "very small," 
reflecting the fact that all the major forces which govem the dynamics 
should be captured by the evolutionary dynamic defined by D, which here 
takes the form of the replicator dynamics. 
We check how the model reacts to the introduction of such a perturba-
tion. The stability analysis of the replicator dynamics with drift will give us 
information about the effects of small changes in the vector field on the 
equilibria of the system defined by the replicator dynamic (in other words, 
it will test the structural stability of such equilibria). To simply the exposi-
tion, f31 and f32 have been chosen to be 1/2, since only the value of f33 
tums out to be genuinely significant. 
We start by looking at the case of the replicator dynamic without drift 
(i.e., when A = O). We know from Proposition 2 that NE is global1y interior 
attracting, since it attracts every interior path under any monotonic selec-
tion dynamic (of which the replicator dynamic is a special case). We now 
take a closer look at the stability properties of each component of Nash 
equilibria separately (i.e., NEo and NE1). 
Figure 2 shows a phase diagram describing trajectories of the replicator 
dynamic starting from sorne interior initial conditions. The Nash equilib-
rium component NEo (NE1) is represented by a bold segment in the 
bottom-left (top-right) comer of the state space .:l. First notice that, as we 
know from Proposition 2, all trajectories converge to a Nash equilibrium of 
the game. Moreover, the diagram shows (consistently with Proposition 4) 
that there are sorne trajectories of the replicator dynamic which converge 
to NEo, the Nash equilibrium component in which both players 1 and 2 
deliver the false message with probability 1. However, this latter compo-
nent is not asymptotically stable, as can be easily spotted from the 
diagram. Trajectories starting arbitrarily close to NEo, provided x 3 > ~, 
will eventually converge to the truth-telling component. We surnrnarize the 
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FIG.2. The replicator dynamic and game G. 
key properties of these trajectories in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 5. Under the replicator dynamic (i) NE1 is interior asymptot-
ically stable, whereas (ií) NEo is noto 
Proof See Cabrales and Ponti (1998, Proposition 5). I 
We now move to the analysis of the replicator dynamic with drift. 
Let 13 E (0,1) be a generic element of the space of the feasible pertur-
bation. Figure 3 shows trajectories of the replicator dynamic with drift 
under two different specifications of 13. Figure 3(b) represents a situation 
in which, in the proximity of NEo, the drift against m~ is uniform across 
players, where in Fig. 3(a) the drift against m~ is lower. As the diagrams 
show, there is a local attractor close to NE1 in both cases. Moreover, non e 
of the elements of NEo is a restpoint of the dynamic with drift in Fig. 3(b). 
In contrast, in Fig. 3(a) there is an additionallocal attractor which belongs 
to NEo: trajectories starting close to NEo converge to it, as it happens in 
the case of the replicator dynamics without drift. 
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FIG.3. The dynamic with drift and game G. 
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We are interested in the convergence and stability properties of (8) 
when A ~ 0, considering two different configurations of the drift parame-
ter f3: 
CASE A: ( 
23 - 4V30 ) 
f3 E 0, 49 
CASEB: (
23 - 4V30 ) 
f3 E 49 ,1. 
Given 23 -4~J1íf 0.0222673, CASE A depicts a situation in which, for small 
values of Xi' the drift against the untruth-telling strategy is substantially 
lower for player 3 than for her opponents. 
In the following proposition we characterize the set of restpoints of the 
dynamic with drift, together with their stability properties: 
PROPOSITION 6. Let RE( (3) be the set of restpoints of (8) for A suffi-
ciently close to O. The following properties hold: 
(a) Vf3 E (0,1), RE( (3) contains an element of NE\ which is also 
asymptotically stable. 
(b) Under CASE A RE( (3) contains also two additional restpoints, 
both belonging to NEo, one of which is asymptotically stable. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
As we acknowledged in Section 1, there is a striking similarity between 
the content of Proposition 6 and the findings of Gale et al. (1995). They 
also find that, for the entry game, the Nash component in which the 
incumbent carries out her "incredible threat" is reachable under the 
replicator dynamics. Moreover, like our NEo, it fails to be interior asymp-
totically stable, but for certain parameter values it may be asymptotically 
stable when the system is slightly perturbed. Given the failure of asymp-
totic stability without perturbations, one would expect any perturbation to 
move the system away from the unstable component and the weakly 
dominated strategy to become extinct. Proposition 6 tells us that evolution-
ary game theory does not provide a ground for such a claim. Once again, 
the intuition he re is similar to the one in Gale et al. (1995). When there is 
drift, strategies against which the weakly dominated strategy do es poorly 
will have positive weight at all times and, therefore, the part of the 
dynamics that depends on payoffs pushes against the dominated strategy. 
On the other hand, drift may provide a direct push in favor of the 
dominated strategy (and more crucially, in favor of those strategies of the 
other players which do well against the dominated strategy). When the 
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balance between these two forces is right, one gets a stable equilibrium 
with non-negligible weight for the dominated strategy. 
6. BEST-REPLY DYNAMICS AND SJOSTROM'S MECHANISM 
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario. Suppose that x(t) 
evolves according to the dynamics 
i = BR(x) - x, (9) 
with BR(x) denoting the mixed strategy best-reply correspondence BR: 
Ll ~ LlY This alternative dynamic defines a (continuous-time) version of 
the classic best-reply dynamics, often proposed as an alternative to the 
evolutionary dynamics studied hereto. We can give two interpretations to 
(9). Following Matsui (1992), we can use (9) to approximate the evolution 
of an infinite population of players who occasionally update their strategy, 
selecting a best reply to the current population state x(t). Alternatively, (9) 
can be regarded as the continuous-time limit (up to a reparametrization of 
time) of the well known fictitious play dynamic.14 This dynamic accounts 
for the evolution of players' beliefs, when these beliefs follow the empirical 
frequencies with which each pure strategy profile has been played (and 
perfectly observed) in the past, and agents select, at each point in time, a 
pure strategy among those which maximize their expected payoff, given 
their current beliefs. 
Let Si = {mi E Mi IR: = R i}, Si = {mi E Si IRl-l = Ri- 1, R:+l = Ri+1}, 
with S = {s¡}, i El denoting the pure Nash equilibrium in which all agents 
consistently reveal their true preferences (i.e., the "solution" of r given 
the true preference profile R). 
PROPOSITION 7. Any interior solution of (9) converges to s. 
Proof See the Appendix. I 
13 Notice that, for sorne x E ~, BR(x) can take infinitely many values. Thus, uniqueness of 
the solution of (9) is not guaranteed. However, since BR(x) is upper-hemicontinuous with 
closed and convex values, it can be shown that the differential inclusion x E BR(x) - x has 
at least one (interior) solution x(l, x(O)), which is Lipschitz continuous and defined, for any 
I 2: O (Aubin and Cellina, 1984, Chapo 2). On the stability properties of (9) see Hofbauer 
(1997). 
14 First introduced by Brown (1951) as an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria, fictitious 
play has been recently re-interpreted as a learning model by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993). We 
prefer here the non-standard version in continuous-time to be consistent with the rest of the 
papeL Nevertheless, in an earlier version of this paper we prove that the same results still 
hold if the dynamics are defined in discrete-time. 
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For best-reply dynamics we have shown that every interior solution 
converges to the unique equilibrium whose outcome is the one the planner 
wants to implement. This is so beca use since initial beliefs are completely 
mixed, they will always be completely mixed, so these weakly dominated 
strategies will always remain suboptimal, will never be played, and their 
weight in beliefs will eventually vanish. This implies that nonequilibrium 
strategies by which agents misrepresent their neighbors' preferences be-
come also suboptimal, and agents will learn not to use them.15 
The results obtained here are so different from those we derived in the 
previous sections essentially because the difference in growth rates be-
tween two pure strategies, in the case of the best-reply dynamics (9), need 
not satisfy Lipschitz continuity. The only strategies with a positive growth 
rate are best responses; this implies that there is an infinite response of 
growth rates to changes in the sign of the differences in payoffs, which is 
precisely what Lipschitz continuity rules out. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that there is room for doubt about the practicability of 
one of the leading examples of implementation with iterated deletion of 
weakly dominated strategies when agents are boundedly rational. As we 
said in Section 1, there are only few papers that study implementation with 
boundedly rational players, so a deeper theoretical study with evolutionary 
tools of other mechanisms studied in the literature would enhance our 
understanding of the performance of these mechanisms with this type of 
agent, a necessary step before mechanisms are used in real life. 
Further empirical study is at least as necessary. It would, for example, 
help to answer the question about which of the dynamics assumptions is 
more appropriate. In this sense, there is already sorne evidence on mecha-
nism design and learning algorithms. Chen and Tang (1998) have done 
experiments with the basic quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard 
(1977) and the paired-difference mechanism by Walker (1981). They esti-
mate different learning models using experimental data, showing that 
variants of stimulus-response learning algorithms (whose expected law of 
motion is the replicator dynamics) outperform the generalized fictitious 
play model. This is also consistent with the good performance that Roth 
and Erev (1995) show for stimulus-response learning algorithms in mim-
15 By analogy, it can be proved that every interior trajectory of (9), for game r, converges to 
(1, 1, 1) (see Cabrales and Pon ti, 1998, Proposition 7). 
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icking the behavior of a range of experimental data, which includes other 
weakly dominance solvable games, like the ultimatum game.16 
But even more importantly, the empirical and experimental work would 
help to design games with good convergence properties to the preferred 
social outcome by revealing how people adjust their play in games like that 
studied in this paper, as well as in other mechanisms proposed by the 
literature. We have already begun to do such experimental studiesY 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show 
that any interior trajectory converges. The reason is that, once conver-
gence has been proved, we can apply the standard result "convergence 
implies Nash under any monotonic selection dynamics" (see, e.g., Weibull, 
1995, Theorem 5.2 Gii)). 
W e start by observing that the dynamic is forward invariant. This implies 
that xJt) is always defined and positive, for any nonnegative t. By 
monotonicity, x 3{t) is also a positive, increasing function of t and bounded 
aboye by 1 (since m1 is a weakly dominant strategy). Therefore, x3{t) must 
converge (this already implies convergence of player 3's mixed strategy). 
Let xi == lim t -> 00 x ¡(t), when such a limit exists. Three alternative cases 
have to be discussed. 
(a) xj = o. If xj = O there must be a time t' such that xit) < ~ for 
t> t'. This implies that there is a k> O such that for all t' > t, dIlJx{t» 
< -k for i = 1,2. This implies, by monotonicity, limt->oo xJt) = O for 
i = 1,2; thus x* = (O, O, O). 
(b) xj = 1. By a similar argument, monotonicity implies x* = (1, 
1,1). 
(c) xj E (0,1). We want to prove that xj cannot converge to a value 
within this range unless the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. To do 
so (given the special features of our example) it is enough to show that, if 
xj E (O, 1), then both players 1 and 2 select, in the limit, the same pure 
strategy. Given that this implies convergence of the full mixed strategy 
16 In their paper, Roth and Erev (1995) show that these dynamics explain the data 
significantly better, according to quadratic deviation measures and others, than a generalized 
fictitious play model which can accommodate behaviors ranging from fictitious play to best 
response dynamics by the estimation of a "forgetfulness parameter" which weights past 
information. For the experimental evidence on learning rules, see also Tang (1996), Chen 
et al. (1997), and Mookherjee and Sopher (1997). 
17 See Cabrales et al. (1998) and Gantner et al. (1998). 
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profile, the result follows. More formally, what we need to prove is 
contained in the following lemma: 
LEMMA 1. Jf xj E (O, 1) then either 
xi = O, i = 1,2 ( CASE O hereafter) 
or 
xi = 1 i = 1,2 (CASE 1). 
Proo! Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that neither of the 
aboye statements is true. In this case, there must exist a sequence {tk}k~ 1 
and a positive constant 8> O such that either X¡(tk) > 8, i = 1,2, or 
X¡(tk) < 1 - 8, i = 1,2 for all k (in other words, as sume that the system 
stays infinitely often an 8 away from the faces of á in which player 1 and 2 
play the same pure strategy). We already noticed that these are the only 
faces of á in which both pure strategies for player 3 yield the same payoff. 
If the system stays away from these faces infinitely often along the solution 
path, then the integral of the payoff difference álI/x(t» goes to infinity 
as t goes to infinity. 
To show this, notice that álI¡(x(t» is a continuous function of x(t) 
defined over a compact set (á). In the case of player 3, such a function 
takes the following form: 
(10) 
Take gM == max¡E 1 x . E ~[Ig¡(m¡, x_¡(t))ll, i.e., the highest possible growth 
,-/ -1 
rate (in absolute value) over all strategies and players (we know a max 
exists, since also g/J is continuous in á). Then define 7 1, 72' 73' and 74 as 
follows: 
8 
(i.e., 7) = l:~]), 7 1 solves 8 exp[ -gM71] = 2" 
8 (i.e., T, ~ ln[ -2 + ~l) 7 2 solves (1 - 8 )exp[ -gM72] = 2" gM 
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S 
'T3 solves s exp[gM'T3 ] = 1 - "2 
6" 
'T4 solves (1 - s )exp[gM'T4] = 1 - "2 
Let a'T == min[ 'T l' 'T 2' 'T 3' 'T4 ] be the lower bound for the time interval in 
which, after each tk , ~ < x¡ < 1 - ~, i = 1,2 and therefore MIix(t)) still 
remains bounded away from O (i.e., MIix(t)) > e(1 -3 e/2) > O, 'r:ft E [tk , tk 
+ a'T D. Denote by G
e 
= {x E LlI MIlx) ¿ e(1-3 e/2)}. Now define 'Y¡(x(t)) 
as the time derivative of the log of the ratio between the probabilities with 
which each of player i's pure strategies are played, which can be expressed 
in terms of the difference in the growth rates: 
a ( x¡{t) ) x¡(t) (l-x¡(t)) 
'Y¡ ( x ( t )) == al In 1 - x ¡ ( t) = X ¡ ( t) - 1 - X ¡ ( t) 
x¡( t) 
Also 'Yix(t)) is a positive number bounded away from zero infinitely 
often since, by Assumption d.1, it is a continuous function of x(t) defined 
on a compact set, which preserves the same sign of Lln 3(x(t)). This implies 
that we can always define a constant ge = minx E G
E 
'Yix(t)), with ge > O 
by Assumption d.2. Also by Assumption d.2, 'Yix(t)) > ge <=> Lln/x(t)) 
> e(1 -3 e/2). If we integrate the value of 'Y/x(t)) over time we then obtain 
which implies that xr = 1, which leads to a contradiction. I 
To summarize, Lemma 1 shows that, if xr E (0,1), x1(t), and xzC!) must 
converge (and therefore x(t) must converge to a Nash equilibrium). Since 
this exhausts aH cases the result foHows. I 
Proof of Proposition 3. We being by noting that, against any m -i E M - i' 
aH strategies mi E S¡(R*) yield the same payoff, as they only differ in i's 
announcement about herself. Since supp[x_¡] ~ S_JR*), totaHy inconsis-
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tent sta tes (the only sta tes where announcements about i's own type 
influence her own payoff) are excludt>d. 
For aH Xi such that xim; > ° only if mi E S¡{R*) we have 
u¡( Xi' x-J ~ L Xr;Ui(Xi' x-J + (1 - L xr;) 
m¡ESi m¡ES¡ 
Then 
;::: (1- L * xr;)[Ilj'¡'ixtl(Vi(f¡(cP(i,R*)),Ri) - vi(O,Ri)) 
m;E S;{R ) 
+(1- Ilj'¡'ixtl)(vi(O,Ri) - [1¡n)] , 
which is great than zero since, by (4), 
I 
The foHowing lemma wiH be useful in the proof of Proposition 4. 
LEMMA 2. Let any mi' m'i E Sj(R*) and Xj. Then 
Proa! Le~Lj such thatxt¡ =xtl for aH mj E Sj(R*)\mj, xt¡ = ° 
for aH mj E S/R*), and xt} = xii + L.m¡ES/R*)Xt¡. 
Since u¡(m¡, x_) = u¡(m'¡, x_) for all x_¡ E S_¡(R*), then g/mi' x_) 
= gJm;, x-J 
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By Lipschitz continuity we have that 
g¡{m¡,x_J -g¡(m¡,L¡) ¿ -Klx_¡ -L¡I (11) 
g¡(m'¡,.L¡) -g¡(m'¡,x_J ¿ -Klx_¡ -LJ (12) 
Since g¡(m¡, L¡) = g¡(m'¡, L) and Ix_¡ - LJ = Xi' the result follows by 
adding up inequalities (11) and (12). I 
Proof of Proposition 4. By contradiction. 
Suppose that (a) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i and strategy m¡ E S¡(R*) and that the boundary time is 
t'. Then it must be 
X;"i(t') H 
x;"'(O) = exp[ -hgt'] x;"i (O) . 
Notice that, for all t, 
u¡(m¡,x_¡{t)) - u¡(mi,x_¡(t)) 
:s; u¡(O,R¡)Ilj*¡xjj(t) + u;(1- Ilj*¡xji(t)) 
-( u¡(f¡( <{l(í, R*)), R¡)Ilj*¡xji(t) 
+u¡(O,R¡)(l - Ilj*¡xji(t))) 
= U; - u¡(O, R¡) 
- Ilj*¡xjJ(t)(u¡(f¡(cP(i,R*)),R¡) + U; - 2u¡(0,R¡)). 
Since (b) is true for t < t', 
u¡(m¡,x_¡(t)) - u¡(mi,x_¡(t)) 
< U; - u¡(O,R¡) -Hn - 1(u¡(fJcP(i,R*)),R¡) + U; - 2u¡(0,R¡)). 
Thus, 
which, by Assumption d.2 and the definition of h{." and hg , implies that 
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Given X;n1(tl) :::; H, if we integrate g/mi' x_Jt)) - g/m;, x_¡(t)) from O 
to ti, we obtain the foHowing: 
This is a eontradietion. 
Suppose that (b) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i, and that the boundary time is ti. Then, it must be true 
that x;n1 (t') = H. 
Notiee that Lemma 2 implies that, for aH m¡ E S/R*)\{mj}, 
Sinee (a) holds for t < ti, (13) implies that 
By integration, 
Adding over aH strategies in S¡(R*), 
This implies X;'1(tl) > H (using the assumption x[nf(O)L > H), whieh is a 
eontradiction. 
Suppose that (e) is the statement that stop s being true earliest, that it 
does so for agent i, and that the boundary time is ti. Then it must be 
x;n1 (t') /x;ni(t') = Cx;n1 (O) /x;ni(O»)(l/ L). 
By Lemma 2, for aH m¡ E S¡(R*)\{mj}, 
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Since (a) holds for t < t', (14) implies that 
By integration, 
which implies that 
which is a contradiction. Since this exhausts all cases the result follows. I 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is constructed as follows. We first 
characterize the limit of the set of restpoints RE( 13), and then analyze the 
stability properties of each of its elements. 
We start by observing that, given 13 E (0,1), any restpoint must be 
completely mixed, and it also must be x 3 > 13, as LlII 3(.) is always positive 
in the interior of the state space Ll (because m~ is a weakly dominated 
strategy). We also know, by continuity of the vectorfield with respect to Á, 
that every limiting restpoint of the dynamic, as Á goes to zero, must lie in 
the set of restpoints of the unperturbed dynamic RE( G). 
First, we analyze the limit set of restpoints under CASE O. In this case, 
both players 1 and 2 play their strategy m~ with probability 1, that is 




and an analogous expression can be obtained for x21 Á. Denote by x~ a 
limiting value in a restpoint, if a limit exists, for x 3• When the limiting 
values for Xl and X 2 are zero we have 
X 6 
lim -=- = ....,--------;:-,-




Notice that, in this case, if a restpoint exists, it must be x~ < ~, since 
x¡/ A > O. We set x3 / A = 0, substitute x¡/ A with the expression in (16), 
solve for x 3' and substitute Xi' i = 1,2 and A by their limiting value of 
zero. The solutions for x~ take the following form: 
XAQ -3 -
1 + 7[3·.j1- [3(46 - 49(3) 
10 
1 + 7[3 - J1- [3(46 - 49(3) 
10 
and 
Remember that x~ must be a real, positive number, with [3 < x~ < ~. For 
the expression under the square root at the numerator to be nonnegative, 
it must be that [3 E [0, 23 ~4~M :::::: 0.0222673], which determines the feasi-
ble range for both roots. Within this interval of values for [3, x~ (XV is a 
strictIy decreasing (increasing) function of [3, which has a minimum and a 
maximum, whose values are 15 ~3;& (O) and -fu (15 ~3;& ), respectively. As 
Q ~ 23 ~ 4& both solutions converge to 15 ~ 2& fJ 49' 35 . 
We now deal with the subset of limiting restpoints under CASE 1, i.e., 
with limiting values for Xi = 1 for i = 1,2. The equations corresponding to 
(15) and (16) are now 
(1 - XI) 12( Xl - ~) 
(17) 
A x l (7x 3 + x 2(1 - x 3 ) - 3) 
(1 - x¡) 3 
lim 2(2x~ - 1) , (18) xi~l A 
A-->O 
where x~ denotes a limiting value for x 3 (if a limit exists). By analogy with 
CASE 0, we know from (18) that, if a restpoint exists, it must be x~ > ~. 
There is a unique feasible solution for xL 't/[3 E (0,1) which has the 
following form: 
A 3+4[3+V9 - 16[3(1-[3) 
Xl = 3 10 . 
Following the same procedure for the remaining restpoints of the unper-
turbed dynamics (i.e., the pure strategy profiles which belong to RE( G) 
and do not satisfy either CASE ° or CASE 1) does not add any element to 
the limiting set of restpoints of the perturbed dynamics. This should not be 
surprising, as any other restpoint of the unperturbed replicator dynamics is 
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unstable with respect to the interior. Since this exhausts all cases, the 
result follows. 
We now move to establish the stability properties of each limiting 
restpoint separately. The Jacobian matrix J(x, A) for the dynamic system is 
as follows: 
(1 - 2xl ) Llll l - A 
-(1-x l )x1(1-x3 ) (1 - x1)x1(7 + x 2 ) 
12 12 
- (1 - X 2 )X2(1 - x 3 ) (1 - 2x2 ) Llll 2 - A 
(1 - X 2 )X2(7 + Xl) 
12 12 
(1 - 2x2 )(1 - X 3 )X3 (1 - 2x l )(1 - X 3 )X3 (1 - 2x3 ) Llll3 - A 6 6 
We analyze CASE ° first. We know that, in this case, we have two 
restpoints, which we call XO == (0,0, xV and XO == (0,0, xV. We evaluate 
the Jacobian when Xl' x 2 ' and A are equal to their limiting value O.e., 
zero). The corresponding eigenvalues are {O, ( - 3 + 7x~) /12, ( - 3 + 
7x~)/12}. There are then two OdenticaI) negative eigenvalues (since any 
limiting x~ < ~ for CASE O), while the third eigenvalue is equal to zero. 
To determine the stability properties of the perturbed system, the sign of 
the eigenvalue whose limit is zero becomes crucial given that continuity of 
JO ensures that the other two will be negative, for any A sufficientIy small. 
We now linearize the restpoints (as a function of A) around NEO. We set 
x( A, 8) == (81 A, 82 A, X ~ + 83 A), where 8 == (81, 82 , 83) denotes the vector 
collecting the coefficients of the linearized system. We then evaluate the 
following expression: 
a det(J(x A) 1- ) 
,J,.O( ° ,,) == l' 'x(A,o) 
'1' x 3 ' u 1m . 
,1.-->0 aA 
We do so because det(J(x, A», which is equal to zero Vx E NEO, will 
preserve the sign of the third eigenvalue, given that the sign of the other 
two will stay constant (and negative) when X is sufficientIy close to NEO 
and A is sufficientIy small. For CASE ° we get the following result: 
-54 + x~(252 + 294xn + (81 + 82 ) 




We first notice that (19) does not depend on 83, To evaluate sign(cf>°(x~, 8)) 
we only need to get estimates of 81 and 82 , the linear coefficients which 
measure the responsiveness of the equilibrium values of Xi' i = 1,2 to 
small changes in A. We do so by setting limA -> ° :AD(X, A)lx(A,IJ) = O and 
solving for {81, 82 , X~}. There are two alternative set of solutions; each of 











23 - 4913 + 7.j1 - 13(46 - 4913) 
81 = 82 = ------8------
We evaluate the numerator of (9) for both sets of solutions, obtaining the 
expressions 
v 3( -7 + 32213 - 34313 2 + (4913 - 23)V1 - 4613 + 49132) 
cf>( 13) = 10 
2863 - 14747613 + 88288213 2 - 154624413 3 
+82354313 4 + kV146f3 + 4913 2 ~(f3)=------10-0-0------
with k = (3887 - 6012313 + 16566913 2 - 11764913 3 ). 
(20) 
(21) 
Both J>0( 13) and ~O( 13) are plotted in Fig. 4. As the diagram shows, 
J>0( 13) is always negative in the domain [O, 23 ~4~#]' whereas ~O( f3) is not. 
In consequence, iO is asymptotically stable whereas XO is noto 
We now move on to CASE 1. Here we have a unique restpoint, which 
we call Xl == (1,1, xD. The eigenvalues of the unperturbed dynamics are as 
follows: {O,O - 2x3 )/3,0 - 2x3 )/3}. As in CASE O, there are two (iden-
tical) negative eigenvalues (given that x 3 > ~), and the remaining eigen-
value is equal to zero. By analogy with CASE O, we define i( A) == O -
81 A, 1 - 82 A, x~ + 83 A) and solve limA -> ° ddAD(x, A)IX(A, IJ) = O to get esti-
mates of 8. The unique feasible solution (corresponding to the unique 










FIG. 4. Asymptotic stability of the dynamic with drift. 
The function corresponding to (20) and (21) now takes the form 
Al _ 24(-a+(2- 413)Va) 
fjJ(13)- 5 ' 
with a = 9 - 1613. The function c$l( ¡3) is also plotted in Fig. 4. As the 
diagram shows, c$l( 13) stays negative 'Vf3 E (0,1). Thus, Xl is asymptoti-
cally stable under any drift configuration. I 
Proaf af Prapasitian 7. For any given arbitrary preference profiles 
R E <1>, with R =1= R, m¡ = {mi $ S¡ I RLl = R¡_l' R:+ 1 = R¡+ l} is weakly 
dominated by m¡ = {mi E S¡ I R:_ l = R¡_l' R:+ l = R¡+l}' which in tum 
implies that, for any interior solution xCt, x(O)) of (9), i;'t(t) = -x;'iCt) 
and, therefore, 
lim X;'i(t) = O (22) 
t --> oc 
for any m¡ $ Si. Let .& denote the face of Ll spanned by the restricted 
game (f, R)lxsi , with 13(.<;) = {x E Ll : Ilx - .&11 :::; e}. An implication of 
(22) is that .& is globally interior attracting for the best-reply dynamics (9), 
as it contains the set of undominated mixed strategies. Furthermore, for all 
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i El, s¡ is a strictly dominant strategy for game (f, R)lxSi • This implies 
that there must exist sorne positive constants s and T(s) such that 
BR(x) = s for any x E B(s) and x(t) E B(s) for any t ~ T(s). We can 
evaluate T(s) explicitly solving (1 - s)exp[ - T(s)] = s: 
(23) 







defines the unique interior solution of (9) for t sufficiently large. This, in 
turn, implies lim t -> oc x(t) = s. I 
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